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Abstract in English 
This cumulative dissertation presents four contributions that attempt to shed light on the 
issues regarding price bubbles in Chinese agricultural commodity market. 
Given that the public and policymakers show their concern on the price bubbles in Chinese 
agricultural commodity market, chapter 2 and 3 investigate the origin of price bubbles in 
futures and spot markets, respectively. In particular, after accurately identifying the bubble 
dates in agricultural futures market and fixing the estimation bias of rare events models, our 
empirical results in chapter 2 indicate that bubble episodes only account for a very limited 
proportion of the sample period, meanwhile, China’s corn and soybeans markets respond 
differently to the speculative activity and external shocks from international markets. Price 
bubbles are more likely to be associated with strong economic activity, high interest rates and 
low inflation levels. Furthermore, by gauging the synchronization level of bubble occurrences 
between futures and spot markets in chapter 3, we find that even cointegrated futures and spot 
prices for agricultural commodities seldom bubble together. Further analysis through a 
regime-switching approach of price transmission reveals that the adjustment effect of futures 
prices on spot prices is the lowest during the regime where bubbles occur the most frequently 
for spot prices, while the spot price returns are more likely to be affected by its own lagged 
terms. All these results challenge the idea that bubbles are originated from over-
financialization in futures markets and are then transmitted to spot markets. Therefore, we 
conclude that futures price bubbles are more sensitive to fundamental factors, while spot price 
bubbles are more likely to be affected by their own market features. Apart from empirical 
analyses on the origin of price bubbles, it is widely believed that bubbles could distort 
resource allocation and a recession usually follows the collapse of bubbles. Inspired by the 
findings from chapter 2 and 3, chapter 4 attempts to build a systematic theoretical framework 
that explains the observed economic process with bubbles. From a new perspective of firm 
growth, we construct a theoretical model to describe the evolvement of bubbles, including 
their origin, development, collapse, and their effect on the output of economy. Following our 
research topic, chapter 5 tends to investigate the effects of the newly established futures 
contract for apples in China. The results of various tests suggest that the apple futures market 
does not serve well for the price discovery and may reduce the spot price volatility to some 
extent. In order to improve the efficiency of the apple futures market, the regulators should 
consider effective measures to attract more commercial traders from different regions in 
China into the futures market. 
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Abstract in German 
Diese kumulative Dissertation besteht aus vier Beiträgen; dabei gilt es, die Probleme 
bezüglich Preisblasen auf dem chinesischen Agrarrohstoffmarkt zu beleuchten. 
Angesichts der Aufmerksamkeit der Öffentlichkeit und der politischen Entscheidungsträger 
bezüglich der Preisblasen auf dem chinesischen Agrarrohstoffmarkt wird jeweils in Kapitel 2 
und 3 die Entstehung von Preisblasen auf den Termin- und Kassamärkten untersucht. 
Insbesondere nach genauer Identifizierung des Blasendatums auf dem Agrar-Terminmarkt 
und Korrektur der geschätzten Abweichung von Modellen für seltene Ereignisse zeigen 
unsere empirischen Ergebnisse in Kapitel 2, dass die Blasenepisoden nur einen sehr 
begrenzten Anteil der Abtastperiode ausmachen, und dass die Märkte für Mais und 
Sojabohnen in China unterschiedlich auf spekulative Aktivitäten und externe Schocks auf den 
internationalen Märkten reagieren. Die Preisblasen hängen eher mit der starken 
Wirtschaftstätigkeit, den hohen Zinssätzen und der niedrigen Inflation zusammen. Darüber 
hinaus wird in Kapitel 3 durch die Messung des Synchronisationsgrades der Blasen zwischen 
dem Termin- und Kassamarkt festgestellt, dass selbst die kointegrierten Termin- und 
Kassapreise der Agrarrohstoffe selten gleichzeitig Blasen bilden. Eine weitere Analyse durch 
den Regime-Switching Ansatz der Preisübertragung zeigt, dass der Anpassungseffekt des 
Terminpreises an den Kassapreis am geringsten ist während des Zeitraumes, in dem die 
Kassapreisblasen am häufigsten auftreten. Zudem werden die Kassapreisrenditen eher von 
ihren eigenen verzögerten Konditionen beeinflusst. Alle diese Ergebnisse stellen die Idee in 
Frage, dass Blasen durch Überfinanzialisierung auf den Terminmärkten entstehen und dann 
auf die Kassamärkte übertragen werden. Daraus schließen wir, dass die Termin-Preisblasen 
empfindlicher auf fundamentale Faktoren reagieren, während die Kassa-Preisblasen eher von 
ihren eigenen Merkmalen des Marktes beeinflusst werden. Abgesehen von empirischen 
Analysen zur Entstehung von Preisblasen wird allgemein angenommen, dass Blasen die 
Ressourcenallokation verzerren könnten und die Rezession der Wirtschaft normalerweise auf 
den Zusammenbruch der Blase folgt. Inspiriert von den Ergebnissen aus Kapitel 2 und 3 wird 
in Kapitel 4 versucht, einen systematischen theoretischen Rahmen aufzubauen, um den 
beobachteten wirtschaftlichen Prozess mit Blasen zu erklären. Aus einer neuen Perspektive 
konstruieren wir ein theoretisches Modell, um die Entwicklungsübersicht der Blasen zu 
beschreiben, das ihre Entstehung, ihre Entwicklung, ihren Zusammenbruch und ihre 
Auswirkung auf die Wirtschaftsleistung einschließt. Im Rahmen des Forschungsthemas 
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werden in Kapitel 5 die Auswirkungen des neueingerichteten Apfel-Terminkontrakts in China 
erforscht. Die Ergebnisse verschiedener Tests zeigen an, dass der Apfel-Terminmarkt die 
Preisfindung nicht gut fördern, aber die Volatilität der Kassapreise in gewissem Maße 
verringern kann. Um die Effizienz des Apfel-Terminmarktes zu erhöhen, sollten die 
Regulierungsbehörden wirksame Maßnahmen in Betracht ziehen, mehr gewerbliche Händler 
aus verschiedenen Regionen Chinas für die Teilnahme an Termingeschäften zu gewinnen.  






Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary 
 
 
The global agricultural commodity markets have witnessed price booms and busts during the 
last decades. Around the financial crisis of 2007/08, agricultural commodity prices, such as 
corn and soybeans, reached their historical high levels. Fig. 1.1 and 1.2 below show the (log) 
corn and soybeans futures prices in Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) from 2006 to 2017. It 
indicates that both corn and soybeans have experienced significant price booms and busts 
around 2007-2008 and 2010-2012. This has triggered a lasting public and academic concern 
on the existence, causes, and effects of agricultural commodity price bubbles.  
Due to that food expenditure takes a large proportion of the poor’s income, the welfare of 
people in developing countries could be strongly affected by a large increase in grain prices 
(Tadesse et al. 2014, Bellemare 2015). In addition, the livelihood of farmers mainly depends 
on agricultural production. The drastic fluctuations of agricultural commodity prices may 
further affect farmers’ production decisions (Gouel 2014). Therefore, the agricultural price 
anomalies are supposed to have profound and complicated effects on the welfare of the poor 
in developing countries.  
As pointed out by the World Bank (2018), the rapid growth among the major emerging 
markets and developing economies over the past 20 years has boosted the global demand for 
various commodities, especially given that 39 percent of the increase in global food 
consumption between 1996 and 2016 is from emerging economies. Being the most populous 
emerging economy, China plays an important role in global markets and suffers welfare 
losses from volatile agricultural commodity prices. Especially after becoming a member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) at 2001, China’s agricultural market has become more 
and more integrated into the international market (Hernandez et al. 2014). Figure 1.1 and 1.2 
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show that both Chinese corn and soybeans prices (from Dalian Commodity Exchange, DCE) 
have experienced similar booms and busts as the US market. Meanwhile, as an important 
producer and consumer of many agricultural commodities, China significantly impacts the 
global supply/demand balance (Coxhead and Jayasuriya 2010). One extremely case is that 
China imported more than half of its consumption volume for soybeans in 2017.  
 
Figure 1.1 CBOT and DCE Soybean Prices 2006-2017 
Source: Own calculations based on data from CBOT and DCE using Stata 15. 




Figure 1.2 CBOT and DCE Corn Prices 2006-2017 
Source: Own calculations based on data from CBOT and DCE using Stata 15. 
 
Another important feature about the agricultural commodity markets is the increasing 
financialization over the last decades. As stated by Master (2008), ‘assets allocated to 
commodity index replication trading strategies have grown from $13 billion in 2003 to $317 
billion in July 2008. At the same time, the prices for the 25 commodities that make up these 
indices have risen by an average of over 200%’. The unprecedented inflow of institutional 
funds into commodity futures market has been considered as the primary reason for 
agricultural price bubbles (Master 2008, 2009, Basak and Pavlova 2016). Irwin and Sanders 
(2012) refer to this argument as Masters Hypothesis, which is often cited by sequent studies in 
this field.  
Although many people describe commodity price booms coupled with massive speculation as 
price bubbles, the basic definition of asset price bubbles is straightforward: if the reason that 
the price is high today is only because investors believe that the resale price will be higher 
tomorrow and the fundamental factors do not seem to justify such a price (Stiglitz 1990, 
Scheinkman and Xiong 2003, Gürkaynak 2008). The fundamental value of an asset is 
determined by the standard present discounted value (PDV) of its future dividends. Pindyck 
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(1992) further develops the present discounted value model of rational commodity pricing, 
which uses convenience yields as future payoffs for storable commodities. Thereby, the 
standard theoretical framework of asset price bubbles could be applied to commodity prices.  
More importantly, it is noticeable that rational expectations cannot prevent the occurrence of 
price bubbles defined above. The intertemporal no-arbitrage condition holds in the case of 
rational price bubbles, namely the bubble would grow in the risk-free interest rate. The 
standard PDV model would have multiple equilibria under the hypothesis of rational 
expectations, which suggests the indeterminacy of bubble solutions (Blanchard and Watson 
1982). Price series containing with various bubble paths could evolve without violating 
rational expectations. A detailed mathematical deduction of this process will be presented in 
the methodology part of Chapter 2. Evans (1991) further generalizes the model of rational 
price bubbles into a periodically collapsing form. The type of bubbles in this dissertation is 
constrained to rational price bubbles. For irrational bubbles, please refer to the research work 
of Shiller (2015). 
So far, no consensus has been reached about the underlying factors driving the price bubbles 
in agricultural commodity futures markets. There are two main strings of studies on the 
possible factors. The first one is consistent with the ‘Master hypothesis’, arguing that 
agricultural commodity price bubbles are caused by over-financialization. Related studies 
empirically investigate the effect of over-financialization on agricultural price bubbles and 
find mixed evidences (Headey and Fan 2008, Sanders and Irwin 2011, 2017, Will et al. 2013, 
Etienne et al. 2015, Etienne 2017). Nevertheless, the regulators have taken measures to curb 
speculative positions in agricultural futures markets. Scholars show their worries that these 
anti-speculation measures may lower the efficiency of agricultural futures markets, due to that 
speculators play an important role in price discovery and are important counterparties to 
commercial traders (Tirole 1982, Sanders and Irwin 2010). Another string of studies focuses 
on fundamental economic factors, such as supply/demand pressure, economic climate index, 
exchange rate and so on (Krugman 2008, Frankel 2014, Etienne et al. 2017, Li, Chavas, et al. 
2017). They argue that price bubbles are more likely to occur under certain conditions of 
fundamental economic factors. Increasing empirical evidences tend to support this point 
(Boyd et al. 2018).  
Meanwhile, it is noticeable that few studies have investigated price bubbles in agricultural 
spot markets. The co-integration relationship between agricultural futures and spot prices 
guarantees a long run equilibrium across markets (Pindyck 2001). The return on purchasing a 
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commodity and selling it for deliver using futures contracts equals the interest forgone less the 
convenience yield net of storage costs (Kaldor 1939, Working 1948, Telser 1958, Casassus et 
al. 2013). This link is supposed to guarantee the Law of One Price (LOP) (Listorti and Esposti 
2012). Hence, one underlying point of the ‘Master hypothesis’ is that agricultural price 
bubbles caused by over-speculation in futures market would simultaneously transmit to 
agricultural spot markets. As a result, commodity prices in spot market would also exceed 
their fundamental values. 
However, the deduction from the cointegrated relationship to the bubbles’ synchronisation 
between futures and spot prices lacks solid support from theories and empirical studies. 
Futures contracts are generally supposed to speed up the homogenizing process of traders’ 
common expectations concerning a future event. Evidences from experimental economics 
show that futures markets dampen, though do not eliminate, bubbles (Porter and Smith 2003). 
Moreover, nonlinear price transmission or sluggish response to market information could 
result in temporary disjunction between cointegrated prices (Listorti and Esposti 2012, Loy et 
al. 2016, Alexakis et al. 2017). This raises our suspect about the bubble synchronisation 
between the agricultural futures and spot markets. If bubbles in agricultural futures market 
truly reflect the changes of fundamental economic factors, bubbles in spot market should not 
be caused by speculation in futures market. The true origin of commodity price bubbles may 
be attributable to certain features of the spot market. 
Apart from the empirical studies on agricultural commodity price bubbles, there is still an 
urgent issue regarding the theoretical modelling of bubbles. Many insightful theoretical 
models for price bubbles have been constructed on the basis of the Overlapping Generations 
(OLG) framework proposed by Samuelson (1958). The advantage for this kind of models is 
that they do not impose any terminal conditions on price series and explain the economic 
process with bubbles (Samuelson 1958, Tirole 1985, Olivier 2000, Martin and Ventura 2012). 
Nevertheless, the finite lived agents of OLG framework cannot be used for empirical analyses 
on the price data, which is based on calendar time (Miao 2014). Kocherlakota (1992, 2008) 
made important contributions to the infinite-horizon models. The bubble is considered as a 
windfall to the firms and relax their borrow constraints. In the presence of financial frictions, 
bubble trades could enhance financial market efficiency and economic growth.  
The moment we notice the bubbles in the market, their potential precipitating factors has long 
been existed in the economy (Shiller 2015). Thus, it needs a more comprehensive explanation 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary 
6 
 
on the formation of price bubbles in agricultural markets, especially considering that most 
previous studies only focus on the effect of over-financialization and seldom refer to other 
bubble theories. Although the model of rational bubbles is useful to explain the existence of 
bubbles, it doesn’t explain the underlying market process: neither the timing of a bubble, nor 
the reasons for its onset, nor the type of transactions that occur during the bubble episodes are 
explained by this model (Lux and Sornette 2002). Meanwhile, the shortage of the theoretical 
models based on the OLG framework is the assumption of finite lived agents, who could only 
live for two or three periods, otherwise the model would be extremely complicated. Therefore, 
we still need new efforts to explain the economic process with bubbles. Inspired by the 
studies by Kocherlakota (1992, 2008) and Martin and Ventura (2012), we try to construct a 
new model that embodies the rational bubbles into economic process. 
Given that there are only a few empirical researches into the agricultural commodity price 
bubbles in China, this cumulative dissertation consists of four independent studies that 
contribute to the research on the origin of agricultural price bubbles, price transmission during 
bubble episodes, as well as a new theoretical model that explains the effects of bubbles on 
economic growth. The first study (Chapter 2) is devoted to identifying the exact bubble dates 
in Chinese agricultural corn and soybeans futures markets and to investigating the possible 
contributing factors to the formation of bubbles. The second study (Chapter 3) measures the 
degree of bubble synchronisation between agricultural futures and spot markets and attempts 
to analyse the price transmission processes during bubble episodes. The third study (Chapter 4) 
provides a new theoretical framework of asset price bubbles and sheds light on the economic 
effects of bubbles by assuming infinite lived agents. The last study (Chapter 5) evaluates the 
performance of the global first fresh fruit futures contract for apples (red Fuji) in China. 
Each study is summarized below. The summary includes the aim of the study, the data, the 
methods applied, and the main results. The main conclusions, policy implications, and 
limitations of each contribution are presented in Chapter 7. 
Price Bubbles in Agricultural Commodity Markets and Contributing Factors: Evidence 
for Corn and Soybeans in China  
Given the fact that Chinese agricultural commodity futures markets have experienced similar 
fluctuations as the international market (see Figure 1.1 and 1.2), the objectives of this study 
are to detect the bubble dates for corn and soybeans futures prices, and to investigate the 
possible contributing factors to agricultural price bubbles in China.  
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We concentrate on the two highly traded agricultural commodities in Chinese futures market, 
namely corn and soybeans. Using individual futures contract prices drawn from the Dalian 
Commodity Exchange (DCE) during the period 2006-2017, we apply a recently developed 
rolling window right-side augmented Dickey-Fuller test to identify the bubble dates. After 
detecting the bubble dates for each commodity species, we examine the contributing factors to 
agricultural price bubbles in China using a multinomial logistic model.  
The results indicate that price bubbles account for 5.48 % (3.91 %) of the sample period for 
corn (soybeans). For the contributing factors, we find that market liquidity and speculation 
have opposite effects on the occurrences of bubbles in the corn and soybeans futures markets. 
World stocks-to-use and exchange rates affect the occurrences of bubbles in a different way 
for each commodity, as well. Price bubbles are more likely to be associated with strong 
economic activity, high interest rates and low inflation levels. 
Agricultural Price Transmission between Futures and Spot Markets during Price 
Bubbles 
Using the weekly price data from Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE) and China Grain 
Reserves Group Company over the period 2009-2017, this article measures the degree of 
bubble synchronisation between futures and spot markets for corn and soybeans in China. A 
new approach comparing the standard deviation of bubble shares with that of perfect bubble 
synchronisation/staggering is applied to gauge the degree of bubble synchronisation between 
markets. To further investigate the interdependence between agricultural futures and spot 
prices during their bubble episodes, we use the Markov Switching Error Correction Model 
(MSECM) and the Dynamic Conditional Correlation Multivariate GARCH Model (DCC-
MGARCH).  
Our results provide little evidence for bubble synchronisation between the agricultural futures 
and spot prices. This does not support the prediction from the conventional co-integration and 
Granger-causality relationships. Bubbles are more frequent and durable for agricultural spot 
prices, even though futures prices dominate the price discovery. Specifically, the results from 
the MSECM model suggest a nonlinear transmission across the futures and spot prices. The 
co-integration relationship becomes weak and the adjustment effect of the spot price toward 
the long-run equilibrium is the lowest during the regime with the most frequent spot price 
bubbles. The agricultural spot price returns are more likely to be affected by its own lagged 
terms. Through the DCC-MGARCH model, we further find a very loose dynamic volatility 
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interdependence between these two prices. These features of agricultural spot markets could 
have resulted in more frequent bubbles. 
Economic Growth, Bubbles, and Firm Size Distribution 
The relationship between bubbles and economic growth has received increasing attention by 
scholars, particularly in a production economy with financial frictions. The existing literature 
generally investigates the effect of bubbles on economic growth by embedding the bubbles 
into the framework of Overlapping Generations (OLG); however, the interpretation of these 
models for economic data are limited. A new theoretical model is constructed in this chapter 
to combine the model of rational bubbles and the stochastic model of firm growth proposed 
by Ijiri and Simon (1967). Under the assumption of infinite lived agents, we relax the 
propositions that allow the occurrences of bubbles and investigate the effects of bubbles on 
the dynamic economic process. A simulation is then conducted to show that our model is 
useful to demonstrate the bubble’s process and economic development.  
Price discovery and volatility spillovers in Chinese apple futures market 
The Red Fuji apple futures contracts introduced in China at the end of 2017 marked the first 
fresh fruit trade at a futures exchange. This paper investigates the performance of the newly 
established apple futures market, using the data from the Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange 
(ZCE) in China. After identifying a weak correlation between apple futures and spot prices, 
we gauge the synchronisation degree of price changes across major apple spot markets 
nationwide and investigate the volatility spillovers between the apple futures and spot markets.  
We find that the apple futures market has a limited function of price discovery, which 
undermines its hedging effectiveness for commercial traders. The establishment of apple 
futures market doesn’t improve the synchronisation level of price changes among the major 
apple markets in China. Moreover, the volatility analyses through GARCH and BEKK-
MGARCH models indicate that the apple spot price volatility has increased significantly 
during the last two years, but we find that futures price tends to reduce the spot price volatility 
in the short term. Our study reveals that apple futures market does not serve well for the price 
discovery and may reduce the spot price volatility. This raises a doubt about whether fresh 
fruit is suitable for futures trading.  
  




Alexakis, C., Bagnarosa, G., and Dowling, M., 2017. Do cointegrated commodities bubble 
together? the case of hog, corn, and soybean. Finance Research Letters, 23, 96–102. 
Basak, S. and Pavlova, A., 2016. A Model of Financialization of Commodities. The Journal 
of Finance, 71 (4), 1511–1556. 
Bellemare, M. F., 2015. Rising Food Prices, Food Price Volatility, and Social Unrest. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 97 (1), 1–21. 
Blanchard, O. J. and Watson, M. W., 1982. Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial 
Markets [online]. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper No. 945. 
Available from: http://www.nber.org/papers/w0945 [Accessed 21 Jan 2019]. 
Boyd, N. E., Harris, J. H., and Li, B., 2018. An update on speculation and financialization in 
commodity markets. Journal of Commodity Markets, 10, 91–104. 
Casassus, J., Liu, P., and Tang, K., 2013. Economic Linkages, Relative Scarcity, and 
Commodity Futures Returns. The Review of Financial Studies, 26 (5), 1324–1362. 
Coxhead, I. and Jayasuriya, S., 2010. China, India and the Commodity Boom: Economic and 
Environmental Implications for Low-income Countries. The World Economy, 33 (4), 
525–551. 
Etienne, X. L., 2017. Irrational exuberance in the Chinese iron ore market? Applied 
Economics Letters, 24 (16), 1161–1166. 
Etienne, X. L., Irwin, S. H., and Garcia, P., 2015. Price Explosiveness, Speculation, and Grain 
Futures Prices. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 97 (1), 65–87. 
Etienne, X. L., Irwin, S. H., and Garcia, P., 2017. New Evidence that Index Traders Did Not 
Drive Bubbles in Grain Futures Markets. Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, 23. 
Evans, G. W., 1991. Pitfalls in Testing for Explosive Bubbles in Asset Prices. The American 
Economic Review, 81 (4), 922–930. 
Frankel, J. A., 2014. Effects of speculation and interest rates in a “carry trade” model of 
commodity prices. Journal of International Money and Finance, 42, 88–112. 
Gouel, C., 2014. Food price volatility and domestic stabilization policies in developing 
countries [online]. HAL. No. hal-01123318. Available from: 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01123318.html [Accessed 3 Feb 2020]. 
Gürkaynak, R. S., 2008. Econometric Tests of Asset Price Bubbles: Taking Stock*. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 22 (1), 166–186. 
Headey, D. and Fan, S., 2008. Anatomy of a crisis: the causes and consequences of surging 
food prices. Agricultural Economics, 39 (s1), 375–391. 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary 
10 
 
Hernandez, M. A., Ibarra, R., and Trupkin, D. R., 2014. How far do shocks move across 
borders? Examining volatility transmission in major agricultural futures markets. 
European Review of Agricultural Economics, 41 (2), 301–325. 
Ijiri, Y. and Simon, H. A., 1967. A Model of Business Firm Growth. Econometrica, 35 (2), 
348–355. 
Irwin, S. H. and Sanders, D. R., 2012. Testing the Masters Hypothesis in commodity futures 
markets. Energy Economics, 34 (1), 256–269. 
Kaldor, N., 1939. Speculation and Economic Stability. The Review of Economic Studies, 7 (1), 
1–27. 
Kocherlakota, N., 2008. Injecting rational bubbles. Journal of Economic Theory, 142 (1), 
218–232. 
Kocherlakota, N. R., 1992. Bubbles and constraints on debt accumulation. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 57 (1), 245–256. 
Krugman, P., 2008. More on Oil and Speculation. New York Times [online], 2008. Available 
from: https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/more-on-oil-and-speculation/. 
Li, J., Chavas, J.-P., Etienne, X. L., and Li, C., 2017. Commodity price bubbles and 
macroeconomics: evidence from the Chinese agricultural markets. Agricultural 
Economics, 48 (6), 755–768. 
Listorti, G. and Esposti, R., 2012. Horizontal Price Transmission in Agricultural Markets: 
Fundamental Concepts and Open Empirical Issues. Bio-based and Applied Economics, 
81–96. 
Loy, J.-P., Weiss, C. R., and Glauben, T., 2016. Asymmetric cost pass-through? Empirical 
evidence on the role of market power, search and menu costs. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 123, 184–192. 
Lux, T. and Sornette, D., 2002. On Rational Bubbles and Fat Tails. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 34 (3), 589–610. 
Martin, A. and Ventura, J., 2012. Economic Growth with Bubbles. American Economic 
Review, 102 (6), 3033–3058. 
Master, M. W., 2008. Testimony before the Committe on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Afairs. [online]. Available from: www. 
hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/052008Mas ters.pdf. 
Master, M. W., 2009. Testimony before the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. 
[online]. Available from: http://www.cftc. 
gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/hearing080509_masters.pdf. 
Miao, J., 2014. Introduction to economic theory of bubbles. Journal of Mathematical 
Economics, 53, 130–136. 
Olivier, J., 2000. Growth-Enhancing Bubbles. International Economic Review, 41 (1), 133–
152. 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary 
11 
 
Pindyck, R. S., 1992. The Present Value Model of Rational Commodity Pricing [online]. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper No. 4083. Available from: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4083 [Accessed 22 Jul 2018]. 
Pindyck, R. S., 2001. The Dynamics of Commodity Spot and Futures Markets: A Primer. The 
Energy Journal, 22 (3), 1–29. 
Porter, D. P. and Smith, V. L., 2003. Stock Market Bubbles in the Laboratory. Journal of 
Behavioral Finance, 4 (1), 7–20. 
Samuelson, P. A., 1958. An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the 
Social Contrivance of Money. Journal of Political Economy, 66 (6), 467–482. 
Sanders, D. R. and Irwin, S. H., 2010. A speculative bubble in commodity futures prices? 
Cross-sectional evidence. Agricultural Economics, 41 (1), 25–32. 
Sanders, D. R. and Irwin, S. H., 2011. The Impact of Index Funds in Commodity Futures 
Markets: A Systems Approach. The Journal of Alternative Investments, 14 (1), 40–49. 
Sanders, D. R. and Irwin, S. H., 2017. Bubbles, Froth and Facts: Another Look at the Masters 
Hypothesis in Commodity Futures Markets. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68 (2), 
345–365. 
Scheinkman, J. A. and Xiong, W., 2003. Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles. Journal of 
Political Economy, 111 (6), 1183–1220. 
Shiller, R. J., 2015. Irrational Exuberance: Revised and Expanded Third Edition. Princeton 
University Press. 
Stiglitz, J. E., 1990. Symposium on Bubbles. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (2), 13–18. 
Tadesse, G., Algieri, B., Kalkuhl, M., and von Braun, J., 2014. Drivers and triggers of 
international food price spikes and volatility. Food Policy, 47, 117–128. 
Telser, L. G., 1958. Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton and Wheat. Journal of 
Political Economy, 66 (3), 233–255. 
Tirole, J., 1982. On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations. Econometrica, 
50 (5), 1163–1181. 
Tirole, J., 1985. Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations. Econometrica, 53 (6), 1499. 
Will, M., Prehn, S., Pies, I., and Glauben, T., 2013. Is Financial Speculation with Agricultural 
Commodities Harmful or Helpful? – A Literature Review of Current Empirical 
Research [online]. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. SSRN Scholarly 
Paper No. ID 2333076. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2333076 
[Accessed 19 Mar 2018]. 
Working, H., 1948. Theory of the Inverse Carrying Charge in Futures Markets. Journal of 
Farm Economics, 30 (1), 1–28. 
World Bank, 2018. Global economic prospects 2018: The Role of Major Emerging Markets in  
Global Commodity Demand. [online]. Available from: 














Chapter 2 Price Bubbles in Agricultural Commodity 
Markets and Contributing Factors: Evidence for Corn 





Qianqian MAO1, Yanjun REN2, Jens-Peter LOY1 
 
1 Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Kiel, Germany. 
2 Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), 





This paper was accepted for publication in China Agricultural Economic Review 
 
Mao, Q., Ren, Y., & Loy, J. P. (2020). Price bubbles in agricultural commodity markets and 
contributing factors: evidence for corn and soybeans in China. China Agricultural Economic 
Review. doi: 10.1108/CAER-10-2019-0190 




The purpose of this paper is to detect the existence of price bubbles and examine the 
possible contributing factors that associate with price bubble occurrences in China 
agricultural commodity markets. Using recently developed rolling window right-side 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, we first detect the dates of price bubbles in China’s 
two important agricultural commodity markets, namely corn and soybeans. Then, we 
use a penalized maximum likelihood estimation of a multinomial logistic model to 
estimate the contributing factors of price bubbles in both markets, respectively. 
Results from the bubble detection indicate that price bubbles account for 5.48 % 
(3.91 %) of the studied periods for corn (soybeans). More importantly, we find that 
market liquidity and speculation have opposite effects on the occurrences of bubbles 
in the corn and soybeans market. World stocks-to-use and exchange rates affect the 
occurrences of bubbles in a different way for each commodity, as well. Price bubbles 
are more likely associated with strong economic activity, high interest rates and low 
inflation levels. The results imply that China’s corn and soybeans market respond 
differently to the speculative activity and external shocks from international markets. 
Therefore, future policy regulations on commodity markets should focus on more 
commodity-specific factors when aiming at avoiding bubble occurrences. 
Keywords: Price Bubbles; Agricultural Commodities, Futures Markets, China 
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2.1 Introduction  
The word ‘price bubble’ creates a mental picture of an expanding soap bubble, which 
is destined to burst suddenly and irrevocably (Shiller 2015). Among the substantive 
research on the global financial crisis in 2007/08, the controversy on price bubbles in 
commodity futures markets is long lasting (Gutierrez 2013). It has been widely 
recognized that price bubbles could distort market trades since prices are the most 
important signals for traders (Phillips et al. 2012). Meanwhile, price explosiveness on 
agricultural commodity markets may reduce the welfare of the poor due to rising food 
expenditures (Carter et al. 2011). Such crisis may even cause economic and political 
instabilities (Bellemare 2015). World Bank (2008) reports that 130 million people in 
developing countries fell into extreme poverty and suffered from food shortages due 
to the sudden increasing prices in food and fuel markets around 2007/08. This has 
urged scholars and policymakers to further understand the explosive nature of 
commodity prices. 
A price bubble is a situation in which an asset price is higher (lower) than its 
fundamental value derived from the discounted dividend stream (Brunnermeier 2008, 
Gürkaynak 2008, Gutierrez 2013). A price spike is a comparatively large upward or 
downward movement of a price over a short period of time. Price bubbles are price 
spikes, but the reverse is not necessarily true. Price spikes can be caused by structural 
changes of fundamental values (Harvey et al. 2016). Many studies show that some 
historical price spikes are not price bubbles. Those spikes are systematic and rational 
responses to underlying economic structural changes (Meltzer 2002, Etienne et al. 
2015).  
After the financial crisis, the two main strings of studies on the possible factors 
contributing to price bubbles result in mixed findings. One string of these studies 
attributes bubbles to massive speculation or growing inflow of institutional funds into 
the commodity markets, and particularly argues that the motivation of commodity 
index traders is to diversify their own portfolios, rather than based on the market 
fundamentals (Master 2008, 2009, Basak and Pavlova 2016). Speculators are 
commonly considered to be any trader who is not engaged in the physical trade of a 
commodity (Working 1960), and speculation is regularly defined as a process of 
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transferring price risks for market traders with different beliefs, prospects or risk 
aversions (Tirole 1982). Nevertheless, speculation has long been suspected to distort 
the normal market trades in the extant literature (Boyd et al. 2018). Master (2008, 
2009) states that excessive speculation is the major reason for commodity price 
bubbles in futures markets during the global financial crisis, which is often cited as 
‘Master hypothesis’. He strongly urges restrictive rules on speculative positions in 
commodity futures markets. It is argued that futures markets with a relative inelastic 
supply of futures contracts experience dramatic price changes if new demand from 
excessive speculation is introduced or if speculative activities are not based on market 
fundamentals (Henderson et al. 2015, Sockin and Xiong 2015a). Tang and Xiong 
(2012) find that financialization of commodities leads to a co-movement in returns 
between commodity futures and financial assets. Basak and Pavlova (2016) then 
construct a model of financialization of commodities which suggests that both 
(commodity) index trades and non-index trades could drive up commodity futures 
prices, volatilities and correlations under the financialization of commodities.  
Another stream of studies sees fundamental supply and demand as well as 
macroeconomic factors as the main contributing factors for the significant price rise in 
2007/08 (Will et al. 2013, Boyd et al. 2018). One example in this area is the huge 
demand from bio-energy industries and the increasing demand from emerging 
economies (Krugman 2008, Hamilton 2009, Carter et al. 2012, Kilian and Murphy 
2014). Rapid growth among the major emerging markets and developing economies 
over the past 20 years has boosted the global demand for commodities, especially 
given that 39 percent of the increase in global food consumption between 1996 and 
2016 is from emerging economies (World Bank 2018). Some studies even argue that 
the implementation of the limits on institutional positions may even take the liquidity 
out of the commodity futures markets and result in high price volatility (Brunetti and 
Buyuksahin 2009, Sanders and Irwin 2010, 2011). Using pooled data from different 
agricultural commodity markets in USA, Etienne et al. (2017, 2015) find no effects of 
increasing commodity index trades on bubbles; they conclude that positive price 
bubbles mostly occur in the presence of inventory shortages, strong exports, weak 
US$ exchange rates, and booming economic growth. This is in line with the idea that 
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price bubbles grow when insufficiently informed traders overreact to market news 
(Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003).  
Likewise, macroeconomic factors have been shown to play significant roles in 
explaining the price movements in agricultural commodities (Pindyck and Rotemberg 
1988, Bailey and Chan 1993, Carter et al. 2011), which might contribute to price 
bubbles. For instance, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1988) find that inflation, industrial 
production, interest rates, and exchange rates can be used to explain the co-
movements of different commodity prices. Phillips and Yu (2011) even point out that 
varying interest rates could induce temporary explosive behaviours in asset prices. Li 
et al. (2017) find that price bubbles are more likely to happen under certain 
macroeconomic conditions. In addition, some other studies concerning commodity 
price volatility prove that macroeconomic factors significantly affect the low-
frequency component of price volatility (Engle and Rangel 2008, Karali and Power 
2013). Therefore, macroeconomic factors can capture the critical features of the 
economy and may further affect traders’ expectations of commodity markets. 
This paper concentrates on the price bubbles of corn and soybeans futures market in 
China and hopes to find the potential contributing factors behind these bubbles. China 
has a huge, rigid and everlasting demand for agricultural commodities from its home 
and global market. Its rising food consumption demand has profound effects on the 
world food balance and trade pattern (Coxhead and Jayasuriya 2010) and is often 
taken as the main sources of global commodity price spikes. It is also a special case 
for China that it is the major player as an important agricultural producer and 
consumer in the global market, such as corn and soybeans. Hernandez et al. (2014) 
also find that China is a locally oriented and highly regulated market (2014). They 
verify the dynamic international interlink between China market and many other 
major international markets. Therefore, as the most populated country, it is extremely 
important for China to maintain food safety and keep a stable agricultural commodity 
market. An additional background is that retailing investors are the main force of 
China’s commodity futures market. Since commodity index funds are beginning to 
enter into the futures market recently, it is necessary to study the latent impact of 
speculation and other factors through available data.  
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To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one considering the commodity-
specific factors into the formation of price bubbles for important Chinese agricultural 
markets. Using a newly developed rolling window right-side ADF test (GSADF) with 
the wild bootstrap procedure 1 , we first accurately identify price bubble dates in 
China’s corn and soybeans futures markets. Afterwards, we adopt a penalized 
maximum likelihood estimation of a multinomial logistic model to explore the 
potential factors contributing to price bubbles for each commodity, respectively.  
Importantly, our study is different from the other studies in the way of estimating the 
contributing factors of price bubbles. Due to the rare occurrences of bubbles, the 
existing empirical studies would pool different commodities together, when 
estimating the common potential influencing factors of price bubbles (Etienne et al., 
2015; Li, et al., 2017). This is no longer appropriate if considering the specific 
features of different commodity markets and may even result in misleading 
conclusions. Especially, the commodities we consider here are corn and soybeans. 
These two commodities have different restrictive rules regarding importing from the 
international market in China. One may expect some different effects of world stocks-
to-use and exchange rates in the model of corn and soybeans. In this case, the 
penalized maximum likelihood estimation method of a multinomial logistic model 
enables us to avoid the bias caused by rare events. 
In this paper, we try to fix the estimation bias of rare events models and obtain a 
robust result using data from individual commodity market. If the ‘Master hypothesis’ 
is true that price bubbles are mainly driven by excessive speculation, we may expect 
price bubbles to be accompanied by high futures trade volumes or open interests, and 
do not reflect fundamentals of supply and demand in the market. If the ‘Master 
hypothesis’ is rejected, price bubbles would be the outcome of extreme supply and 
demand conditions on the corresponding commodity, as well as an outcome of 
                                                 
1 The newly developed rolling window right-side ADF test combined with the bootstrap procedure has 
been proved to be an adequate procedure to detecting the location of bubbles, because it could avoid 
“pseudo bubbles” caused by underlying economic structural changes (Harvey et al. 2016). Specifically, 
this method outperforms the other bubble testing procedures, such as sequential Chow-test and 
CUSUM tests, in the case of multiple periodically collapsing bubbles (Homm and Breitung 2012, 
Phillips et al. 2012, 2015). 
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macroeconomic activities. These hypotheses will be investigated for each commodity 
market, respectively. 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as following. Section 2.2 briefly introduces the 
methods to detecting price bubbles, including bubble testing and the penalized 
multinomial logistic model to determine the factors that contribute to price bubbles. 
Section 2.3 describes the data and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 
discusses the main model estimation results. Section 2.5 summarizes the paper and 
presents conclusion. 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Testing for price bubbles 
A conventional definition of a price bubble is that it is a situation in which an asset 
price is higher (lower) than its fundamental value derived from the discounted 
dividend stream (Brunnermeier 2008, Gürkaynak 2008, Gutierrez 2013). If investors 
already know that the present price of an asset is biased from its fundamental value 
and investors are still buying or holding the asset to acquire benefits from future sales, 
price bubbles are rational. The cross-period arbitrage-free condition always holds in 
the case of rational price bubbles, which means the bubble would grow in the risk-free 
rate. Following the study of Blanchard and Watson (1982), the price process of one 




                                                      (1) 
where 𝑃𝑡 represents the price at time t, 𝐷𝑡 represents the dividend or payoff for time t, 
𝑟𝑓 represents the risk-free interest rate and 𝐸𝑡[·] represents the expectation based on 
the information at time t. Taking the convenience yields as the dividends for 
commodities, Pindyck (2001) then finds that equation (1) can be used to explain the 
formation of commodity futures price. Forward iterating equation (1) to infinite 








𝑖=1                                          (2) 
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equation (2) is the unique solution of equation (1) only when the transversality 






𝑘 𝑃𝑡+𝑘] = 0                                                (3) 
However, when equation (3) does not hold, the equation (2) will no longer be the 
unique solution of equation (1). This suggests that a deviation from the fundamental 
price could occur even under the constraint of non-arbitrage. Consider a bubble 
component 𝐵𝑡 with the property 
𝐸𝑡[𝐵𝑡+1] = (1 + 𝑟𝑓)𝐵𝑡                                               (4) 
adding this 𝐵𝑡 into equation (2) will also satisfy equation (1). That is  
    𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝐵𝑡                                                   (5) 
In this case, the non-arbitrage condition still holds, because the bubble component 
grows at rate 𝑟𝑓, and the rational expectation of investors is not biased. Thus, this kind 
of price bubble is called as rational price bubbles. 
Moreover, under the plausible assumption that the dividends would follow a random 
walk with a drift 𝜇  
𝐷𝑡+1 = 𝜇 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑡                                               (6) 










𝐷𝑡                                            (7). 
The first term of the right side of Equation (7) is constant, while the second term is a 
random walk process based on equation (6). Thus, equation (7) shows that the 
fundamental price should be a random walk series and will become an explosive 
process when there is bubble component as in equation (4). For more details, please 
refer to the study of Blanchard and Watson (1982), Gürkaynak (2008), and Hamilton 
(1994). 
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Another important issue is about the existence of negative bubbles, or price bubbles 
during the price downward process. Similar with Etienne et al. (2015), we define the 
positive bubbles as phases in which the average price is higher than the fundamental 
value, while negative bubbles occur when the average price is below the fundamental 
value. Based on the deduction above, it seems that 𝐵𝑡 cannot be negative because it 
will result in a negative price which is not allowed in the markets (Diba and Grossman 
1988). However, it has been found that there are two situations in which bubbles can 
occur during the price downward process. Firstly, the existence of a bubble may lead 
to an increase in interest rates which so depresses the fundamental value that the sum 
of the bubble component and the fundamental falls short of the nonbubbly 
fundamental value. Hence, a rational bubble component may in fact decrease the 
overall price of an asset (Weil 1990). Secondly, Payne and Waters (2005) find that 
negative bubbles are allowed in the case of periodically collapsing bubbles, which 
also satisfy the conditions of equation (1) to (5). Thus, bubbles could occur along both 
with the upward and downward price movements. This suggests that we should 
separate the negative bubbles from positive ones, because the potential contributing 
factors may have opposite effects for these two types of bubbles2.  
The definition of price bubbles above provides the basis for the right-tailed unit root 
test to testing bubbles (Diba and Grossman 1988). When price bubbles occur, the 
rational bubble component of prices is an explosive process, while the remaining part 
is a stationary or integrated process of order one at the most. Phillips et al. (2011, 
2009) further develop the right-tailed unit root test into a new forward recursive right-
tailed ADF test (SADF), which suggest implementing the right-tailed ADF test 
repeatedly on a forward expanding sample sequence and performing inference based 
on the supreme value of the corresponding ADF statistic sequence.  
                                                 
2 It should be noted that both types of bubbles may distort normal market trades and affect farmers’ 
decisions on future consumption and agricultural investments. Positive bubbles occur during the price 
upward movement, while negative bubbles occur during the price downward movement. The main 
reason to distinguish between these two types of bubbles is that they may be derived from different 
mechanisms or contributing factors. The deviating effects of the two types of bubbles depend on the 
income and consumption structures of poorer farm households. Poorer farm households mostly engage 
in agricultural production for their own consumption (Gouel, 2014). For net food buyer households, 
positive bubbles increase their food budget. For net food seller households, negative bubbles lower 
their revenues, which may hinder their agricultural investments and production. Therefore, both 
positive and negative bubbles affect the wellbeing of the poor. 
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A great advantage of this SADF test is that it can identify the points of origination and 
termination of a bubble. Homm and Breitung (2012) use extensive simulations prove 
that the SADF test works satisfactorily for structural breaks, when comparing to other 
bubble testing approaches (such as sequential Chow-tests and CUSUM tests), 
especially it can detect market exuberance induced by a variety of sources, such as 
speculation or the time-varying discount factor. However, all of these methods suffer 
from reduced power when detecting the periodically collapsing bubbles. To solve this, 
Phillips et al. (2012, 2015) propose an alternative approach named the generalized 
supreme ADF test (GSADF). Currently, the GASDF test has been widely accepted 
and used to detect bubbles in many markets, such as stock markets (Caspi and 
Graham 2018, Hu and Oxley 2018), real estate markets(Anundsen et al. 2016, 
Engsted et al. 2016, Pavlidis et al. 2016), and energy markets (Tsvetanov et al. 2016, 
Caspi et al. 2018). Recently, many studies also try to apply this method into the 
agricultural commodity markets (Etienne et al., 2015; Gutierrez, 2013; Li, et al., 
2017). Detailed introduction of the GSADF test is described as following. 
According to Phillips et al. (2015), a recommended empirical regression model of 
random walk process for bubble detection has the following weak (local to zero) 
intercept form: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑑𝑇
− + 𝜃𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑡 with  𝑡 ∼ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(𝜎
2) and 𝜃 = 1                            (8) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the asset price, 𝑑 is a constant, 𝑇 is the sample size and η is a localizing 
coefficient that controls the magnitude of the intercept and drift as 𝑇 → ∞. 
The main idea of the GASDF method is to implement the ADF test on the sequential 
subsets (rolling window) of the whole sample. Suppose that the rolling window 
sample starts from the 𝑟1
𝑡ℎ fraction of the total sample (T) and ends at the 𝑟2
𝑡ℎ fraction 
of the sample, where 𝑟2 = 𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑤  and 𝑟𝑤 > 0 is the fractional window size of the 
regression. The empirical regression model can then be written as 





𝑖=1                                 (9) 
where k is the lag order. The number of observations in the regression is 𝑇𝑊 = ⌊𝑇𝑟𝑤⌋, 
where⌊. ⌋ is the floor function (given the integer part of the argument). The ADF 
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statistic (t-ratio) based on this regression is denoted as 𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1
𝑟2 . Then, the rolling 
regression of the repeated ADF test is implemented for the bubble detection using the 
subsamples of the data. The GSADF relies on the repeated estimation of the ADF 
model. It varies the endpoint of the ADF regression 𝑟2 from 𝑟0 (the minimum window 
width) to 1, and it allows the starting point 𝑟1 to change within a feasible range, that is, 
from 0 to 𝑟2−𝑟0. The GSADF test statistic of 𝑟2 is then obtained as the sup value of 
the corresponding ADF statistic sequence: 
𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) = 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑟1∈[0,𝑟0]
𝑟2∈[𝑟0,1]{ 𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1
𝑟2}                                             (10) 
The origination date of a bubble  ⌊𝑇𝑟𝑒⌋  is calculated as the first chronological 
observation whose GSADF statistic exceeds the critical value. The calculated 
origination date is denoted by ⌊𝑇𝑟?̂?⌋. The estimated termination date of a bubble ⌊𝑇𝑟?̂?⌋ 
is the first chronological observation after ⌊𝑇𝑟?̂?⌋ + 𝐿𝑇 whose GSADF statistic is below 
the critical value. We set the minimum window size to 20 observations, which is 
amount to one month’s trading days3. The bubble duration must exceed the length of 
log(T). Here, in our paper, it is around log(264) = 2.42. The bubble duration should 
at least last 3 days.  
For the calculation of critical values in the GSADF method, Phillips et al. (2012) 
firstly propose to use the Monte Carlo simulation. However, Harvey et al. (2016) find 
that the Monte Carlo method will mistake the potential structural breaks in the price 
series as price bubbles and the results of bubble detection will be quite severely over-
sized. They propose to use the wild bootstrap method to calculate the critical values, 
which will consider the underlying structural break of the time series and thus find 
fewer but more accurate bubble days than the Monte Carlo method. In this paper, we 
adopt the wild bootstrap method. The number of iterations of wild bootstrapping is 
2000. 
                                                 
3 We adjust the minimum window size and find that the result of bubble dates is rather robust. 
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2.2.2 Estimation of Possible Contributing Factors on Price Bubbles 
Employing the GSADF approach, we could identify the bubble dates and types in the 
sample period. Each observation has three possible states, namely no bubble, positive 
bubble and negative bubble. In the case of discrete response models with three 
outcomes, a multinomial logistic model is adequate to test for possible contributing 
factors on the different outcomes (Wooldrige 2010).  There are two commodities, 
namely corn and soybeans, indexed by 𝑖 = 1, 2. The variables of the multinomial 
logistic model are as shown in the equation below: 
𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑀𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖3𝑆𝑂𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖4𝑈𝑆𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 +
𝛽𝑖5𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖6𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖7𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖8𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑡  + 𝛽𝑖9𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡      (11)                                             
where i =1 for corn and 2 for soybeans, the dependent variable ‘Bubbles’ are dummy 
variables which include three categories: positive, negative, and no bubbles (base 
category). As presented in the introduction, the current discussion on the origin of 
agricultural price bubbles mainly focuses on two directions: excessive speculative 
trade and fundamental economic factors. Speculation in futures market has long been 
considered as the source of market instability, because speculators are thought to be 
irrational traders who only want to make extra profits (Boyd et al. 2018). However, 
speculation is also important for risk transferring and price discovery in futures 
markets, and speculators are important counterparties to commercial traders (Tirole 
1982). The trade volume and open interests are used to capture the effects of 
speculation (Castro Campos 2019, Tadesse et al. 2014, Hong and Yogo 2012, Irwin et 
al. 2009). Similarly, bubbles from international commodity markets, e.g. US markets, 
can affect markets in China. Market information from international exchanges is 
available in real time and processed by arbitrage brokers which leads to tightly linked 
futures markets (Hernandez et al. 2014). Price bubbles may thus transmit between 
different markets by these mechanisms.  
The fundamental factors include the stock-to-use ratio, macroeconomic factors, and 
weather shocks (Southern Oscillation Index, SOI). All factors have been found to 
influence the expectation of commodity price (Pindyck and Rotemberg 1988, Gilbert 
2010, Adämmer and Bohl 2015, Etienne et al. 2015, Li, Chavas, et al. 2017, Castro 
Campos 2019). Specifically, the factors of domestic and global stocks-to-use ratios 
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mirror the degree of demand pressure for corn and soybeans, while the weather 
shocks (SOI) significantly affect the traders’ expectations on future supplies. Thereby 
we cover the supply and demand effects. The macroeconomic factors, e.g. the 
exchange rate, the economic climate index (ECI), the interest rates, inflation, and 
gasoline prices, reflect the various economic activities and the impact of business 
cycles. There is plenty of evidence for the impact of macroeconomic factors on the 
movement of commodity prices (Li, et al., 2017; Etienne et al., 2015; Adämmer and 
Bohl, 2015; Frankel, 2014; Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1988). 
Exchange rate changes the incentives to international trade of corn and soybeans. The 
economic climate index reflects the degree of economic activity, which affects the 
demand on various commodities. Interest rates affect investments and commodity 
storage costs. By considering the inflation rate, we control the general price level. 
Gasoline prices reflect energy price, which have direct and indirect effects on 
agricultural commodity markets. More details of the variables will be stated in Table 
2.1. 
One problem in existing studies is that they usually pool the data of different 
commodities together to estimate the effects of the possible contributing factors 
(Etienne et al. 2015, Li, Chavas, et al. 2017). This pooling is due to the rare 
occurrences of bubbles, which may result in a biased estimation of the parameters 
using the conventional multinomial logistic model (King and Zeng 2001). However, 
though some price co-movement caused by common macroeconomic factors can be 
seen in the commodity markets, Ghoshray (2018), Kellard and Wohar (2006) find that 
the price dynamics for related commodities, such as corn and soybeans, tend to be 
distinctly different from each other and warn against the aggregation of commodities. 
This is particularly true in the case of China. China is still a self-sustaining market and 
has high domestic inventory volumes for corn, while China imports more than half of 
its soybean consumption from global markets. According to the statistics from 
China’s General Administration of Customs, the import volume of soybeans in 2017 
is about 95.54 mt. This is a historic peak that increased by 13.9 % compared with 
2016. However, the import volume of corn is only 2.83 mt. Its import share decreases 
by 11 % compared with 2016. As the largest soybean importer, it is important to 
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consider international shocks for soybeans market. In order to avoid the biased 
estimation problem caused by rare events when estimating each market, we adopt the 
penalized maximum likelihood estimation for the multinomial logistic model, which 
can provide an unbiased estimation of the potential contributing factors to price 
bubbles for corn and soybeans, respectively. The penalized maximum likelihood 
estimation (PLE) is developed by Firth (1993) and it penalizes the likelihood 
estimates of a logistic regression using the Jeffreys prior. Similar to the method 
proposed by King and Zeng (2001), the PLE method can reduce the bias of the 
maximum likelihood estimation in the case of rare events for discrete choice models 
(Paul 2012). Fortunately, Colby et al. (2010) has further developed an R package 
‘PMLR’ to employ this method for the multinomial logistic model. 
2.3 Data 
Our study focusses on China, which is one of the most important emerging economies. 
China has a huge, rigid and lasting demand for agricultural commodities not only 
from its domestic market but also from global markets. Forecasts of the world 
economy to 2030 suggest China would continue to become more food import-
dependent (Anderson 2018). Its rising demand for food consumption has profound 
effects on the world food balance and trade patterns (Coxhead and Jayasuriya 2010). 
Effective policies and regulations to keep commodity prices stable require better 
insights into the dates and formation of price bubbles.  
China has established futures markets for many agricultural commodities in the last 
decades (Chang 2020), and they serve important functions for price discovery during 
the process of marketization for most agricultural commodities (Ju and Yang 2019). 
We collect the price data from the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE) in China. 
According to the Futures Industry Association (FIA), the DCE was the 8th largest 
exchange in the world in 2016. Our sample period runs from 2006 to 2017, including 
the periods of global price peaks in 2007/08 and 2010/11. Here, we use the sequences 
of individual futures contract prices and detect bubbles on each futures contract price 
series. The rolling nearby contract price behaving like cash prices is not used, because 
bubbles within it could be entirely driven by fundamental demand and supply factors 
rather than speculative trades in the futures market (Etienne et al. 2015). Meanwhile, 
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nearby futures prices may suffer the potential ‘splicing bias’, because the price jumps 
generated from rolling one futures contract to the next nearby futures contract would 
result in ‘pseudo bubbles’. Unlike nearby contract price, the individual contract price 
should behave as a random walk and reflect the complete evolvement of traders’ 
continuous expectation on the market over the whole trading year (Fama and French 
2013).  
We choose the futures contract with the highest trade volume per commodity each 
year. Taking the corn contract ‘c1701’ as an instance, its time span is from 2016.01.18 
to 2017.01.15. The price data in the delivery month (2017 January) is excluded and 
only the price data from 2016.01.18 to 2016.12.30 is kept. Due to the min-window 
size of the bubble testing method, we further use the price data from 2015.11.16 to 
2016.01.17 of the nearest corn contract ‘c1611’ as our initial window period. Thus, 
we can get a thirteen-month price series for each commodity in 2016. The same 
procedure goes for the other sample periods. Then, we will use the bubble detecting 
method (GSADF) to test each price series and date-stamp the bubbles.  
Table 2.1 presents detailed information on the model variables in equation (11). Trade 
volume and open interest represent the market liquidity and speculation for different 
commodities. Data comes from the Dalian Commodity Exchange (2019). The 
domestic and world stocks-to-use data is from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). We take the initial (not corrected) data available at the respective period. 
The stocks-to-use ratio is the ratio of net consumption over initial stocks of each 
period. For weather shocks, the Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) is used to predict El 
Niño and La Niña episodes, which affects yields of grains in the western and eastern 
tropical Pacific area (Shuai et al. 2016). The ‘USBubbles’ is a dummy variable 
indicating price bubbles for US corn and soybeans markets. This information is taken 
from the study of Etienne et al. (2015)4. The exchange rate and Shibor are from China 
Central Bank. Gasoline is the refined oil price obtained from China Ministry of the 
Commerce. ECI is the economic climate index measuring the economic activity and 
PPI is the production price index (China National Statistical Bureau). Based on the 
                                                 
4 The bubble dates from 2016 to 2017 are calculated by us using the same bubble testing procedure as 
theirs. 
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literature, all these factors may have direct and indirect effects on traders’ 
expectations (Pindyck and Rotemberg 1988, Gilbert 2010, Hong and Yogo 2012).  
Most of the independent variables have a daily frequency, except domestic and world 
stocks-to-use ratios, SOI, Gasoline, ECI and PPI. These variables indicate a monthly 
frequency. We convert monthly data to daily by simply filling up the days of the 
month with the respective monthly observation. As these monthly data do not show 
significant changes in the short-term, the changes in frequency may not affect the 
estimation results (Etienne et al., 2015; Li et al., 2017).  




Table 2.1  Price and Possible Factors Contributing to Price Bubbles (2006-2017) 
Variables Description Corn Soybean 
 




Daily controls    
Trade Volume Daily hands of futures contracts 
exchanged in the Dalian Commodity 







Open Interest Daily number of futures contracts that 
are still open and held by traders 
(thousand contracts). These contracts 


















Shibor The ‘Shanghai Interbank Offered 
Rate’, which is used to represent the 
interest rates. Shibor is regularly 








USBubbles_Positive Dummy variable for positive bubbles 







USBubbles_Negative Dummy variable for negative bubbles 







Monthly controls    
China Stocks-to-use The ratio of changes in the inventory 
volume of each commodity over the 








World Stocks-to-use The ratio of changes in the inventory 
volume of each commodity over the 
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SOI Southern Oscillation Index: Predicting 
the El Niño (La Niña) episodes across 







ECI Index indicator of the economic 









Producer Price Index, which is used to 
represent the inflation rate. It indicates 
the monthly average changes in the 
price levels received by producers for 











Notes: The last two columns report the mean value of corresponding variables and the standard 
deviations are in the parentheses. Monthly data will be converted into daily data by assuming constant 
values throughout the month and their mean value could be calculated on this basis. 
Source: Own calculations with Stata 15. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Bubble Dates 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the relationship between the price trends and bubble 
periods for corn and soybeans, respectively. Similar to global markets, the prices of 
corn and soybeans in China both experience dramatic fluctuations during 2007/08 and 
2010/11. However, we can see that not all bubbles occur at times when prices of 
individual futures contract sharply increase or decrease. 5  This seemingly 
counterintuitive result is also found in other studies using the same methodology 
(Etienne et al. 2015, Harvey et al. 2016). Generally, this kind of results will be 
accepted in former studies. According to asset pricing theory, a normal price series 
should be a random walk process. Here, we should distinguish two types of price 
series. One is a process containing explosive root, and the other one is a process 
behaving as random walk with high price volatility. The price period between 
01jan2008 and 01 jan2009 has been proved to be a random walk without explosive 
roots, its dramatic fluctuations thus should be attributed to the high volatility. To 
                                                 
5 There are some steep changes in the pricing process at the end or beginning of each year because we 
use individual futures contract price for each year. 
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verify this, we further implement the GASDF test on a simulated random walk 
process with high price volatility and still get no evidence of price bubbles6, though 
the simulated random walk also seems to have explosive periods. Another explanation 
is that the wild bootstrap method considers the underlying structural breaks in the 
price process and improves the critical values in certain periods.  
Generally, most bubble episodes last less than 10 days. The maximum single bubble 
duration of corn lasts 24 days from 2008.11.28 to 2008.12.31 and the maximum 
duration of a single soybean price bubble lasts 28 days from 2007.10.11 to 2007.11.19. 
For the bubble frequencies, there are 19 bubbles in the corn market and 16 bubbles in 
the soybean market during the whole sample period.  
As mentioned earlier in the part of methodology, we classify the bubbles into two 
types: positive and negative bubbles. There are 158 days (5.48% of the sample period) 
of price bubbles for corn, 46 days of which are positive bubbles and 112 days of 
which are negative bubbles. In contrast, 113 days (3.91% of the sample period) are 
found to be price bubbles for soybeans, 91 days of which are positive bubbles and 22 
days of which are negative bubbles. Negative bubbles are most frequently observed in 
the corn market, while positive bubbles are more prominent in the soybeans market. 
The different performances of bubbles may also reflect that the corn market is highly 
self-sustaining while the soybean market always experiences shortages. These facts 
suggest there may be different market conditions behind these two markets and we 
cannot simply pool them together as in other studies (Etienne et al., 2015; Li, et al., 
2017). Moreover, the positive and negative bubbles are not tightly connected with 
each other and tend to be independent events. This supports our use of the 
multinomial logistic model to estimate the contributing factors of positive and 
negative bubbles, respectively.   
                                                 
6  The simulated random walk is defined as 𝑦𝑡 = 0.1 + 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑡 ,  𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0,5) . The length of the 
random walk is 264, that is amount to the length of an individual contract price series. The results 
remain constant when the drift term or the random error term varies. 





Figure 2.1 Price Bubbles for Corn 
Source: Own calculations based on data from DCE using Stata 15. 
 
Figure 2.2 Price Bubbles for Soybeans 
Source: Own calculations based on data from DCE using Stata 15. 
More detailed information about the bubble dates is presented in Table 2.5A-1 and 
Table 2.6A-2 in the appendix. In line with former studies using the same bubble 
testing method, we could conclude that price bubbles are rare events and only 
comprise a limited proportion of the sample period. In the following part, we will 
further discuss the effects of possible contributing factors on price bubbles. 
2.4.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results 
We first calculate the descriptive statistics for the independent variables in Table 2.2. 
Compared with periods without bubbles, the mean values of the trade volume and 
open interest are much lower during bubble periods. It may imply that price bubbles 
are more likely to occur under low market liquidity. For the domestic and world 
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stocks-to-use ratios, we could see different trends of mean values during positive 
bubbles and negative bubble episodes. The SOI tends to be negative during negative 
bubble periods. The rest macroeconomic factors do not show significant trends.  
We will use a multinomial logistic model to estimate the effects of the potential 
contributing factors. A penalized maximum likelihood estimation method is applied to 
avoid biases, which occur with conventional multinomial logistic regression. Tables 
2.3 and 2.4 present the main results. Tables 2.7A-3 and 2.8A-4 in the appendix show 
the marginal effects of the independent variables. Signs of the marginal effects are 
consistent with the signs of the corresponding coefficients in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of the Contributing Variables 
Notes: The cells report the mean value of corresponding variables and the standard deviations are in the 
 Corn  Soybean 
 No Bubbles Positive  Negative   No Bubbles Positive  Negative 
















































































































































Observations 2194 38 91  2231 74 18 
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parentheses. The number of bubble days here is different from that in the previous part because there 
are some missing values in the independent variables, such as Shibor. 
Source: Own calculations with Stata 15. 
2.4.2.1 Contributing Factors of Price Bubbles for the Corn Market 
We use two variables to measure the futures market liquidity and speculation, namely 
the trading volume and open interest of the futures contracts under study. Because of 
the highly co-linearity, we introduce each of these two factors separately into the 
model. Table 2.3 shows that all coefficients remain robust in the two models. Trade 
volume and open interest both have significant negative effects on positive bubbles, 
while their coefficients for negative bubbles are insignificant. Higher liquidity and 
more speculation seem not to increase the likelihood of price bubbles for corn. If 
future markets with higher liquidity attract more speculators or if more liquid markets 
imply more speculation, we may conclude that price bubbles of corn are more likely 
to occur during the illiquidity periods with less speculation activities. The futures 
market of corn with higher liquidity is more likely to be invulnerable to external 
shocks. 
The fundamental stocks-to-use factors measure the net consumption of each period 
relative to its beginning stocks and are expected to explain the differences in price 
dynamics of commodities (Wright, 2009). However, we find no significant effects of 
China and World stocks-to-use on the occurrences of bubbles. This may be due to that 
China has a relatively self-sustaining market for corn. Meanwhile, there are various 
policies that prevent excessive price changes of corn. All of these may result in the 
insensitivity of corn price to the changes of domestic and world stocks-to-use. In 
addition, we introduce the (positive/negative) bubble dummy variable in the US 
futures market of corn into the model and find no significant effects. This further 
proves that China’s corn market is more invulnerable to international shocks. Instead, 
the SOI is a significant predictor for both positive and negative bubbles of corn. 
Prolonged positive (negative) SOI index coincides with abnormally cold (warm) 
weather and thus lower (increase) the yield of grains. Therefore, low (high) yield of 
corn suggested by higher (lower) SOI index predicts more positive (negative) bubbles 
in its futures market. Traders in China’s futures market are more sensitive to the 
temperature changes or future yields in the main production area of corn.  
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Moreover, considering the significant negative effects of the exchange rate on both 
kinds of bubbles, a weak RMB (higher exchange rate) may suspend imports from 
international markets and thus reduce external shocks on domestic corn markets. Lin 
and Xu (2019) also find that exchange rate has an inverse ‘U-shaped’ nonlinear effect 
on commodity price in China. Therefore, higher exchange rate may even inhibit 
positive price bubbles. In addition, based on the cost information regularly published 
by Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE), the price of domestic corn is always higher 
than that of the imported corn. When positive bubbles occur in domestic market and 
exchange rate is relatively high, the imported corn is still cheaper than the domestic 
corn and may even help stabilize the domestic corn price. For the other 
macroeconomic factors, higher economic activity could increase the demand for raw 
materials, our results also show that ECI has a significant positive effect on positive 
price bubbles in both models. A higher SHIBOR (Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate) 
significantly increases the probability of positive price bubbles. We may imply that 
less money would flow into the futures market during periods with high interest rates. 
Another possible explanation is that higher interest rates may reduce capital 
investments by suppliers of various commodities, thereby reducing the future supply 
and raising current prices (Pindyck and Rotemberg 1988). With respect to the 
negative effect of inflation, it has been found that there is a chaotic and nonlinear 
interdependence between inflation and commodity price movement (Kyrtsou and 
Labys 2006). A perturbation on inflation level will not necessarily have the expected 
impact on commodity price and can even lead to wide distortions. Zhang et al. (2019) 
further show that PPI has a negative effect on commodity prices in China. As we have 
seen in Figure 2.1, most price bubbles do not occur during the historical high price 
periods. Thus, the negative effect of PPI on positive price bubbles is counterintuitive 
at first glance, but it does reflect the complex and chaotic relationship between 
inflation and commodity prices7.Finally, for the gasoline price, it is often used to 
predict the fundamental prices of commodities and many studies have shown the 
connectedness between energy prices (ethanol) and agricultural prices (Tyner 2010, 
Wu et al. 2011, Adämmer and Bohl 2015). We use this variable to estimate the 
                                                 
7 We further conduct a robustness check of the lagged effects for PPI and find that the estimation 
results remain unchanged (see Table 2.11A-7 and Table 2.12A-8 in the appendix).  
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influence of energy prices and find that a higher gasoline price will lead to more 
positive bubbles and fewer negative bubbles in our models. Thus, it may increase the 
costs of agricultural production and even increase the demand for ethanol producing 
from corn. 
2.4.2.2 Contributing Factors of Price Bubbles for the Soybean Market 
As we can see in Table 2.4, the results of the two models for soybeans are also robust. 
However, compared with the case of corn, the trade volume and open interest of 
soybeans both have positive and significant effects on positive price bubbles. This 
again indicates that the soybeans market has different characteristics or structure with 
the corn market in China. Compared with corn, China always suffers a tight 
demand/supply balance for soybeans. In this case, traders may be more easily to be 
misled by speculative trades. Higher speculation in the soybean futures market could 
thus induce more price bubbles. 
Regarding China’s stocks-to-use for soybeans, positive effects on positive bubbles are 
significant across both model specifications. Price bubbles tend to occur more easily 
during periods of high domestic consumption. We already discussed that China has 
lost control over its soybeans market and faces a shortage problem since joining the 
WTO in 2001. Chinese soybeans market is more open to global markets and thus 
more easily affected by international price shocks. In our model, it is easy to 
understand that the world stocks-to-use ratio has a significant negative effect on 
negative bubbles, which means high demand pressure refrains the soybeans price 
from collapsing. Nevertheless, we find no reasonable explanations for the negative 
effect of world stocks-to-use on positive bubbles, except that many positive bubbles 
may be caused by speculation. Furthermore, though SOI could affect the yield of 
soybeans, it doesn’t change the likelihood of soybeans price bubbles. These results 
may suggest that positive bubbles in soybeans market could be partly caused by 
speculation. More importantly, we find that the positive bubbles in US soybeans 
futures market have significant positive effects on those in China, which proves that 
soybeans markets in China and USA are highly connected with each other. All these 
mixed effects make soybeans price bubbles in China more complicated to predict. 
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When further considering the effects of the exchange rate, negative price bubbles 
occur more frequently in the presence of a weak RMB (higher exchange rate), though 
the costs of importing soybeans increase. As expected for the rest macroeconomic 
factors, a higher ECI increases the likelihood of positive bubbles and reduces negative 
bubbles. SHIBOR has a positive effect on the positive bubbles, similar to the case of 
corn. PPI has a negative effect on the positive bubbles. The gasoline price has no 
direct effects on the bubbles in the soybeans market. 
Table 2.3 Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation for the Multinomial 
Logistic Regression: Corn 
 Model 1 Model 2 


























































































































Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own calculations with R software. 
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Table 2.4 Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation for the Multinomial 
Logistic Regression: Soybeans 
 Model 1 Model 2 



























































































































Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own calculations with R software. 
So far, higher market liquidity and speculation have opposite effects on the bubble 
occurrences in Chinese corn and soybeans markets. Thus, the ‘Master hypothesis’ 
cannot fully explain the origin of bubbles for Chinese agricultural commodities. 
Meanwhile, the fundamental demand/supply factors contribute to price bubble 
occurrences for soybeans, but not for corn. The macroeconomic factors are also found 
to significantly affect the probability of price bubbles, and their effects are not 
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completely the same for the two commodity species. These results cannot be obtained 
if we only use pooled data of these two commodity markets. 
Finally, in order to estimate the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
assumption on the categories of price bubbles, we use two individual penalized 
maximum likelihood estimations and only consider the positive or negative bubbles in 
the model each time. If the IIA is accurate, the individual model that removes one 
category of dependent variables will get a consistent estimation just as with the 
multinomial logistic model but in a less efficient way. Tables 2.9A-5 and 2.10A-6 in 
the appendix show the results of the individual models. Compared with results in 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4, we can see that almost every sign and magnitude of the 
coefficients remain robust. The same holds for the significance levels. We may thus 
conclude that the IIA condition is satisfied in our study. 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Agricultural commodity price bubbles often read as signals for food crises or 
disruptions of normal market operations. After the financial crisis in 2007/08, 
researchers start to find evidence of commodity price bubbles and explore the possible 
contributing factors. Based on daily data from China’s main futures market, this study 
aims to detect the exact dates of bubble occurrences using a recently developed rolling 
window right-sided ADF-test. After determining price bubbles’ dates in the corn and 
soybeans futures market, we examine potential factors contributing to price bubbles in 
each market separately. In the presence of rare events, the penalized maximum 
likelihood method avoids the estimation bias of the regular multinomial logistic model. 
Our results show that bubbles only occur in a very low proportion of days in our 
sample period (2006-2017), namely, 5.48% for corn and 3.91% for soybean. The 
magnitudes of the price changes during these bubble periods are generally small and 
price bubbles usually do not coincide with price peaks or troughs. Bubbles often show 
up when prices suddenly increase or crash.  
The different dates and types of bubbles in the corn and soybean markets imply a 
separate investigation of the potential factors contributing to price bubbles for the two 
markets. Unlike those studies that pool the price bubbles of different commodities 
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together, we try to introduce more commodity-specific factors and estimate their 
effects on bubbles. Specifically, considering the different openness to international 
markets and different self-sufficiency rate of domestic consumption, we use the trade 
volume, open interest, domestic stocks-to-use and world stocks-to-use for corn and 
soybeans, respectively.  
The results show that higher market liquidity and speculation have no significant 
positive effects on bubbles and even reduces the likelihood of positive bubbles for 
corn, while they increase the likelihood of positive bubbles for soybeans. The 
difference becomes more significant, considering that the daily average trade volume 
and open interest of corn are relatively higher than those of soybeans (see Table 2.1). 
This supports the idea that these two markets have different characteristics and may 
thus react differently to speculative attacks. The main difference between Chinese 
corn and soybean markets is the self-sufficiency rate of domestic 
production/consumption. Chinese corn has a high self-sufficiency rate of over 95%, 
while soybean is the largest imported agricultural commodity with the self-sufficiency 
rate less than 25% (Li, et al., 2017). The commodities with higher self-sufficiency rate 
have shown less volatile price movements in China, such as corn, rice and wheat (Li, 
et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2008). In the contrary, Chinese soybean market is often 
confronted with a tight balance of supply/demand and may thus become more 
sensitive to price fluctuations. This is consistent with our findings that Chinese 
soybean market is more vulnerable to speculative attacks, while corn market is more 
stable under higher market liquidity and speculation. 
For the rest of fundamental economic factors, domestic and world stocks-to-use, and 
external bubble shocks (from corresponding USA futures market) exhibit different 
effects across these two commodity markets. Again, we find that Chinese corn market 
is relatively stable, while the soybean price bubbles are more easily to be affected by 
its domestic and world stocks-to-use, and external bubble shocks. This may reflect the 
different market openness for corn and soybeans, since China is highly connected 
with international markets and imports more than half of its soybeans for domestic 
consumption. Moreover, higher exchange rate tends to reduce both types of bubbles 
for corn, while it increases the negative bubbles for soybeans. The weather shocks 
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(SOI) and gasoline price are found to only affect the bubble occurrences in the corn 
market. The probability of positive (negative) bubbles increases when the weather 
condition is bad (good) for the growth of corn. Higher gasoline prices are associated 
with more (less) positive (negative) bubbles. This is consistent with previous studies 
that find increasing demand of corn for producing biofuels leads to a higher corn price 
(Wu et al. 2011, Adämmer and Bohl 2015). Finally, positive bubbles for both corn 
and soybeans are more likely to occur in the presence of strong economic activity, 
high interest rates and low inflation level. 
Furthermore, it should be clarified that relating bubbles to fundamental economic 
factors may be viewed as identifying market conditions when investors are more 
likely to generate different views to the same information (Scheinkman and Xiong, 
2003; Singleton, 2013). Taking positive bubbles as an instance, when exposed to the 
same public information, optimistic traders would be likely to pay more if they 
believe they can get an even higher payoff in the future. China’s futures market 
participants (mainly consisting of retailing investors 8 ) could be sensitive to the 
fundamental economic factors and have more divergent beliefs about futures price. In 
this case, due to the herding behaviours of retailing investors, divergent beliefs 
towards the changes in the fundamental economic factors may thus result in massive 
herding trades, which may further contribute to bubbles. 
We also consider the effects of market intervention policies by Chinese government, 
which may have significantly affected China’s grain futures prices (Xiao et al. 2019). 
China has implemented many national policies to stabilize its agricultural markets 
during the sample period, such as the Minimum Procurement Price Program (MPP), 
National Provisional Reserve Program (NPR) and Target Price Policy (TPP). Some 
studies show mixed results about the effects of the intervention policies in Chinese 
food market. For instance, through a qualitative analysis, Li et.al (2017) find that 
domestic policy instruments have different effects on the bubbles for corn and 
soybeans in China. Yang et al. (2008) find that around 2008 global food crisis, 
                                                 
8 According to the China Futures Market Yearbook (2016), the proportion of investors whose equity is 
lower than 100 000 Yuan is 87.58%, while the proportion of investors whose equity higher than 1 
million Yuan is merely 0.61%. 
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Chinese officials responded to higher world prices by drawing down domestic stocks 
and limiting exports of major grains. Meanwhile, Tan and Zeng (2019) find that the 
reserve policy induces hypercorrection and impels greater price volatility in the pork 
market, and Sun et al. (2018) conclude that China’s temporary soybean trade policies 
do not improve market integration and stability. 
In order to ensure the robustness of our estimation results, we further use dummy 
variables to indicate the implementing period of two important policies (NPR and 
TPP) for corn and soybeans, respectively. The estimation results (see Table 2.13A-9 
and Table 2.14A-10 in the appendix) remain with consideration of the dummy 
variables for NPR and TPP. The policy dummy variables for NPR and TPP seem not 
to affect the bubble occurrences.  
Through comparing futures market for corn and soybean in China, we could conclude 
that these two commodity markets have different frequencies and types of bubbles 
and exhibit different responses to the same contributing factors. This is different from 
the underlying assumption in previous studies that these contributing factors have 
same effects on bubble occurrences, regardless of commodity species (Etienne et al., 
2015; Li, et al., 2017). More importantly, our estimation results indicate that higher 
market liquidity and speculation only increase the probability of bubble occurrences 
for soybean market. Thus, the ‘Master hypothesis’ cannot fully explain the origin of 
bubbles for Chinese agricultural commodities. Our results are more likely to support 
the idea that price bubbles are associated with commodity-specific supply/demand 
pressure and other macroeconomic factors9.  
In conclusion, compared with previous studies that pool different commodities 
together, our result suggests that regulators of commodity markets aiming to avoid 
price bubbles should pay more attention to the specific conditions of each commodity 
market. More information and data on production, consumption and stocks of 
agricultural commodities should be regularly collected and published. This could 
                                                 
9  Please notice that the results from the multinomial logistic model does not necessarily imply a 
causality relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables, and it mainly helps us 
to identify which factors will affect the bubble occurrences significantly. Thus, the endogeneity 
problem is not our major concern in this analysis. The endogeneity problem may be solved if a more 
specific dataset is available in the future. 
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reduce the traders’ wrong expectations and enhance the efficiency of price discovery 
in futures market. Meanwhile, the regulators should be more cautious with the 
measure of restricting speculative positions and focus on the extreme cases of 
economic fundamentals, because speculation activity may have different effects on 
different commodity markets.  
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Table 2.5  A-1: Summary of Price Bubbles for Corn 




Start Peak End 
% Price Change 
 (Start to Peak) 
% Price Change 
 (Peak to End) 
  Start Trough End 
%Price Change 
 (Start to Trough) 
%Price Change 
 (Trough to End) 
2006/02/24 -2006/02/28 3 1504 1514 1501 0.66% -0.86%       
2006/08/07 -2006/08/14 6       1342 1342 1326 0.00% -1.19% 
2006/11/14 -2006/11/28 11 1436 1513 1513 5.36% 0.00%       
2007/06/15 -2007/06/28 10       1653 1561 1561 -5.57% 0.00% 
2007/07/05 -2007/07/18 10       1539 1496 1505 -2.79% 0.60% 
2007/07/24 -2007/07/26 3       1496 1481 1484 -1.00% 0.20% 
2008/11/28 -2008/12/31 24       1517 1411 1438 -6.99% 1.91% 
2009/02/09 -2009/02/17 7 1681 1720 1716 2.32% -0.23%       
2009/11/16 -2009/11/26 9 1734 1762 1762 1.61% 0.00%       
2009/12/01 -2009/12/14 10       1786 1778 1783 -0.45% 0.28% 
2011/06/28 -2011/07/05 6       2310 2265 2275 -1.95% 0.44% 
2011/11/21 -2011/11/30 8       2179 2143 2156 -1.65% 0.61% 
2013/12/19 -2013/12/25 5       2203 2131 2131 -3.27% 0.00% 
2015/06/03 -2015/06/10 6       2209 2128 2128 -3.67% 0.00% 
2015/06/25 -2015/06/30 4       2137 2111 2111 -1.22% 0.00% 
2015/07/24 -2015/07/30 5       2052 1994 2005 -2.83% 0.55% 
2015/09/29 -2015/10/26 15       1922 1873 1899 -2.55% 1.39% 
2015/11/27 -2015/12/04 6 2022 2033 2033 0.54% 0.00%       
2015/12/09 -2015/12/22 10 2046 2069 2063 1.12% -0.29%       
Sum 158days (5.48%)  Positive: 46 days (29.11%)     Negative:112 days (70.89%) 
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Table 2.6 A-2: Summary of Price Bubbles for Soybeans 




Start Peak End 
%Price Change 
 (Start to Peak) 
%Price Change 
 (Peak to End) 
  Start Trough End 
%Price Change 
 (Start to Trough) 
%Price Change 
 (Trough to End) 
2006/04/11-2006/04/13 3             2635 2632 2632 -0.11% 0.00% 
2006/07/24-2006/07/28 5             2595 2541 2541 -2.08% 0.00% 
2006/11/16-2006/11/21 4 2707 2773 2756 2.44% -0.61%             
2007/09/10-2007/09/19 8 3833 4092 4032 6.76% -1.47%             
2007/09/24-2007/09/28 5 3990 4081 4081 2.28% 0.00%             
2007/10/11-2007/11/19 28 4083 4449 4431 8.96% -0.40%             
2007/11/21-2007/12/05 11 4385 4486 4387 2.30% -2.21%             
2007/12/11-2007/12/17 5 4421 4488 4488 1.52% 0.00%             
2007/12/20-2008/01/07 9 4464 4590 4300 2.82% -6.32%             
2009/11/25-2009/12/02 6 3860 3944 3944 2.18% 0.00%             
2009/12/04-2009/12/08 3 3943 4022 4022 2.00% 0.00%             
2012/05/14-2012/05/18 5             4397 4310 4310 -1.98% 0.00% 
2014/08/04-2014/08/14 9 4497 4610 4610 2.51% 0.00%             
2015/04/08-2015/04/10 3             4101 4075 4075 -0.63% 0.00% 
2017/03/10-2017/03/17 6             3943 3897 3897 -1.17% 0.00% 
2017/10/27-2017/10/31 3 3627 3630 3627 0.08% -0.08%       
Sum 113days (3.91%)   Positive: 91 days (80.53%)    Negative: 22days (19.47%) 
Maximum Single Bubble 
Duration: 
28 days                    
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Table 2.7 A-3: Marginal Effects for PMLR model of Corn 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
    Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Cons 2.69 0.06 2.71 0.13 
 (8.59) (1.59) (8.77) (1.53) 
Trade volume/100 -0.04 0.01   
 (0.14) (0.03)   
Open Interest/100   -0.02 0.00 
   (0.07) (0.01) 
China Stocks-to-use -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.15) (0.05) 
World Stocks-to-use 0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.20) (0.04) 
SOI 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) 
USBubbles Positive -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
USBubbles Negative 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.16) (0.04) 
Exchange Rate -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 
 (0.20) (0.07) (0.29) (0.08) 
ECI 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Shibor 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
PPI -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
Gasoline 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Q2 -0.04 0.15 -0.03 0.15 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.17) 
Q3 -0.03 0.16 -0.01 0.16 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.05) (0.18) 
Q4 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.19 
 (0.06) (0.21) (0.08) (0.21) 
Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: The standard deviations are in parentheses.  
Source: Own calculations with R software. 
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Table 2.8 A-4：Marginal Effects for PMLR model of Soybeans 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
    Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Cons 0.86 -1.14 1.02 -1.06 
 (2.01) (2.66) (2.52) (2.62) 
Trade volume/100 0.01 0.00   
 (0.01) (0.00)   
Open Interest/100   0.02 -0.01 
   (0.04) (0.02) 
China Stocks-to-use 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
World Stocks-to-use -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
SOI 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) 
USBubbles Positive 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
USBubbles Negative 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 
 (0.15) (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) 
Exchange Rate -0.03 0.11 -0.04 0.09 
 (0.07) (0.24) (0.10) (0.23) 
ECI 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Shibor 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
PPI -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Gasoline 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Q2 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) 
Q3 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.03 
 (0.17) (0.05) (0.18) (0.06) 
Q4 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 
 (0.26) (0.07) (0.28) (0.06) 
Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: The standard deviations are in parentheses.  
Source: Own calculations with R software. 
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Table 2.9 A-5: Individual Model for Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Corn 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
    Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Cons 199.52*** 5.94 216.11*** 7.23 
 (31.56) (10.50) (25.60) (10.38) 
Trade volume/100 -3.33*** -0.00   
 (0.01) (0.00)   
Open Interest/100   -0.02*** -0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
China Stocks-to-use -1.06 -1.35 -4.24 -1.06 
 (5.66) (1.56) (4.77) (1.59) 
World Stocks-to-use 1.82 -0.56 5.03 -0.51 
 (3.72) (1.39) (3.55) (1.38) 
SOI 2.02*** -0.38** 1.97*** -0.37** 
 (0.50) (0.18) (0.45) (0.18) 
USBubbles Positive -0.85  -0.63  
 (1.51)  (1.51)  
USBubbles Negative  -0.47  -0.51 
  (1.46)  (1.46) 
Exchange Rate -4.83*** -1.58** -7.30*** -1.65** 
 (1.48) (0.73) (1.54) (0.72) 
ECI 0.12*** 0.02 0.14*** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Shibor 0.29 -0.04 0.57** -0.03 
 (0.26) (0.19) (0.23) (0.19) 
PPI -1.64*** 0.03 -1.62*** 0.03 
 (0.26) (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) 
Gasoline 0.35*** -0.12*** 0.25*** -0.12*** 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) 
Q2 -2.40 3.86*** -1.85 3.89*** 
 (1.54) (1.44) (1.50) (1.44) 
Q3 -1.87 4.14*** -0.63 4.21*** 
 (1.51) (1.44) (1.54) (1.44) 
Q4 1.83*** 4.92*** 2.35*** 4.92*** 
 (0.70) (1.43) (0.68) (1.43) 
Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own calculations with Stata 15. 
  




Table 2.10 A-6: Individual Model for Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Soybeans 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
    Positive Negative Positive Negative 
 Cons 41.49** -67.10*** 58.09*** -57.38** 
   (19.46) (21.88) (18.04) (23.18) 
Trade volume/100 0.29*** 0.09   
   (0.09) (0.25)   
Open Interest/100   0.87*** -0.66 
     (0.23) (0.44) 
 China Stocks-to-use 8.12*** 4.36 7.22** 7.16 
   (2.82) (3.68) (2.90) (4.66) 
 World Stocks-to-use -6.70*** -7.70*** -5.22*** -9.87*** 
   (1.93) (2.79) (1.93) (3.48) 
 SOI 0.42 0.16 0.66** -0.02 
   (0.30) (0.44) (0.29) (0.43) 
 USBubbles Positive 1.56*  1.62**  
   (0.80)  (0.82)  
USBubbles Negative  1.61  1.76 
    (1.85)  (1.82) 
 Exchange Rate -1.36 6.48*** -2.03 5.26*** 
   (1.23) (1.79) (1.26) (1.77) 
 ECI 0.14*** -0.08*** 0.17*** -0.06 
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
 Shibor 0.96*** -0.80 1.03*** -0.76 
   (0.23) (0.66) (0.23) (0.66) 
 PPI -0.49*** 0.14 -0.64*** 0.12 
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18) 
 Gasoline 0.09 0.12 0.13** 0.11 
   (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) 
 Q2 -1.92 1.29* -2.09 1.66** 
   (2.37) (0.77) (2.66) (0.80) 
 Q3 3.41*** 1.28 3.87*** 1.70* 
   (1.03) (0.92) (1.11) (1.00) 
 Q4 4.75*** -1.77 5.65*** -1.57 
   (0.97) (1.5270) (1.1162) (1.52) 
 Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own calculations with Stata 15. 
 




Table 2.11 A-7: Individual Model for Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Corn (Lagged PPI) 
    Model 1 Model 2 
    Positive Negative Positive Negative 
 Cons 216.27*** -18.88** 225.28*** -18.08* 
   (10.08) (9.44) (27.00) (9.73) 
 Trade volume/100 -3.79*** -0.03   
   (0.67) (0.06)   
 Open Interest/100   -2.11*** -0.02 
     (0.49) (0.04) 
 China Stocks-to-use -0.02 -2.36 -1.13 -2.26 
   (4.75) (1.60) (4.82) (1.63) 
 World Stocks-to-use 5.14* -2.35* 7.83** -2.31* 
   (2.92) (1.32) (3.25) (1.33) 
 SOI 2.56*** -0.73*** 2.32*** -0.72*** 
   (0.37) (0.18) (0.42) (0.18) 
 USBubbles Positive -1.13  -1.00  
   (1.49)  (1.51)  
 USBubbles Negative  -0.22  -0.24 
    (1.46)  (1.46) 
 Exchange Rate -4.90*** -0.35 -7.32*** -0.38 
   (0.97) (0.67) (1.40) (0.68) 
 ECI 0.05* 0.00 0.07* 0.00 
   (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
 Shibor 0.31 -0.28 0.52** -0.28 
   (0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.21) 
 Lagged PPI -1.75*** 0.19*** -1.63*** 0.19*** 
   (0.08) (0.05) (0.20) (0.05) 
 Gasoline 0.38*** -0.15*** 0.25*** -0.15*** 
   (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) 
 Q2 -3.57** 3.85*** -2.76* 3.86*** 
   (1.53) (1.44) (1.51) (1.44) 
 Q3 -3.38** 4.10*** -1.43 4.12*** 
   (1.51) (1.43) (1.54) (1.44) 
 Q4 1.81*** 4.98*** 2.27*** 4.98*** 
   (0.64) (1.43) (0.65) (1.43) 
Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own calculations with Stata 15. 
 
  




Table 2.12 A-8: Individual Model for Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Soybean (Lagged PPI) 
    Model 1 Model 2 
    Positive Negative Positive Negative 
 Cons 43.89** -70.56*** 63.77*** -61.75*** 
   (21.86) (21.44) (22.15) (18.83) 
 Trade volume/100 0.29*** 0.06   
   (0.11) (0.25)   
 Open Interest/100   0.86*** -0.68 
     (0.23) (0.43) 
 China Stocks-to-use 8.13*** 4.72 7.63*** 7.29 
   (2.78) (3.76) (2.80) (4.48) 
 World Stocks-to-use -6.12*** -7.33*** -4.83*** -9.56*** 
   (1.94) (2.81) (1.87) (3.39) 
 SOI 0.36 0.21 0.58** 0.00 
   (0.27) (0.44) (0.27) (0.42) 
 USBubbles Positive 1.45*  1.50*  
   (0.79)  (0.81)  
 USBubbles Negative  1.89  2.05 
    (1.93)  (1.83) 
 Exchange Rate -1.64 6.50*** -2.33 5.30*** 
   (1.40) (1.71) (1.46) (1.54) 
 ECI 0.13*** -0.08*** 0.16*** -0.06* 
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
 Shibor 1.13*** -0.87 1.27*** -0.87 
   (0.33) (0.67) (0.31) (0.67) 
 Lagged PPI -0.48*** 0.18 -0.66*** 0.16 
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
 Gasoline 0.08 0.10 0.13** 0.09 
   (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) 
 Q2 -3.08 1.27* -4.02 1.61** 
   (3.75) (0.75) (3.54) (0.77) 
 Q3 3.47*** 1.24 3.95*** 1.65* 
   (1.03) (0.88) (1.09) (0.95) 
 Q4 4.74*** -1.57 5.68*** -1.38 
   (0.98) (1.53) (1.1165) (1.52) 
Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Table 2.13 A-9: Individual Model for Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Corn (NPR) 
 Model 1 Model 2 



























































































































Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The variable of ‘NPR’ takes value 1 
when it belongs to the duration of National Provisional Reserve Program (2008.06-2016.03) and 0 otherwise. 












Table 2.14 A-10: Individual Model for Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Soybeans (TPP) 
 Model 1 Model 2 




























































































































Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The variable of ‘TPP’ takes value 1 
when it belongs to the duration of Target Price Policy (2014.11-) and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2.15 A-11: Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation for the Multinomial Logistic Regression: Corn (without 
gasoline price) 
      Model 1   Model 2 
       Positive    Negative    Positive    Negative 
Cons 176.52*** 8.61 232.22*** 9.46 
   (17.20) (9.62) (13.40) (9.83) 
Trade volume/100 -1.83*** 0.01   
   (0.63) (0.05)   
Open Interests/100   -1.85*** -0.01 
     (0.45) (0.03) 
China Stocks-to-use -5.03 -2.26 -4.65 -1.95 
   (5.10) (1.48) (5.28) (1.54) 
World Stocks-to-use 3.37 -1.02 3.74 -1.04 
   (2.79) (1.31) (3.14) (1.31) 
SOI 1.29*** -0.25 1.50*** -0.23 
   (0.35) (0.17) (0.37) (0.17) 
USBubbles Positive -1.70 -0.71 -1.48 -0.71 
   (1.48) (0.87) (1.49) (0.87) 
USBubbles Negative 3.13 -1.21 4.38 -1.25 
   (2.19) (1.45) (2.22) (1.45) 
Exchange Rate -7.02*** -0.44 -9.69*** -0.47 
   (0.96) (0.64) (0.94) (0.65) 
ECI 0.16*** 0.02 0.19*** 0.02 
   (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Shibor 0.25 -0.04 0.44* -0.05 
   (0.24) (0.18) (0.23) (0.18) 
PPI -1.20*** -0.12 -1.53*** -0.12 
   (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) 
Q2 -1.84 3.71*** -1.54 3.74*** 
   (1.50) (1.44) (1.56) (1.44) 
Q3 -0.91 4.00*** 0.28 4.04*** 
   (1.57) (1.43) (1.51) (1.43) 
Q4 2.48*** 4.82*** 2.91*** 4.82*** 
   (0.61) (1.43) (0.63) (1.43) 
Obs. 2321 2321 2321 2321 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own calculations with Stata 15. 
 
  




Table 2.16 A-12: Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation for the Multinomial Logistic Regression: Soybeans (without 
gasoline price) 
      Model 1   Model 2 
       Positive    Negative    Positive    Negative 
Cons 38.81** -73.82*** 46.56** -65.55*** 
   (18.32) (22.26) (20.84) (21.53) 
Trade volume/100 0.25*** -0.09   
   (0.09) (0.31)   
Open Interests/100   0.60*** -0.70* 
     (0.22) (0.41) 
China Stocks-to-use 6.06** 4.73 5.23* 6.93* 
   (2.85) (3.45) (2.89) (4.12) 
World Stocks-to-use -5.59*** -7.07*** -4.15** -9.09*** 
   (1.79) (2.57) (1.90) (3.04) 
SOI 0.27 0.12 0.35 -0.06 
   (0.27) (0.42) (0.29) (0.42) 
USBubbles Positive 1.34* 1.39 1.36* 1.39 
   (0.77) (1.60) (0.77) (1.63) 
USBubbles Negative 3.07 2.52 2.63 2.29 
   (0.75) (1.78) (0.74) (1.84) 
Exchange Rate -2.09* 5.61*** -2.77* 4.62*** 
   (1.10) (1.61) (1.28) (1.55) 
ECI 0.14*** -0.09*** 0.15*** -0.07** 
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Shibor 0.95*** -0.85 0.99*** -0.85 
   (0.22) (0.67) (0.23) (0.66) 
PPI -0.38*** 0.31* -0.42*** 0.29 
   (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
Q2 -1.65 1.38* -1.70 1.68** 
   (2.10) (0.76) (2.24) (0.78) 
Q3 3.17*** 1.18 3.52*** 1.56* 
   (1.06) (0.87) (1.15) (0.94) 
Q4 4.88*** -1.83 5.53*** -1.66 
   (0.99) (1.51) (1.15) (1.51) 
Obs. 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own calculations with Stata 15. 
Through uncentered VIF test, we find that there may be highly collinearity among exchange rate, PPI, 
and gasoline price (their VIF values are above 10). However, both economic theory and extant studies 
show that we cannot simply remove these three variables from the estimated equation (Castro Campos, 
2019; Li, et al., 2017; Etienne et al., 2015; Adämmer and Bohl, 2015; Wooldridge, 2005; Pindyck and 
Rotemberg, 1988), otherwise, it may lead to omitted variables in the error term. Meanwhile, the 
influence of multicollinearity would become very weak under relatively large sample observations 
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(Goldberger 1991, Wooldridge 2005). In our study, the number of sample observations is relatively 
large (2321), which could reduce the potential bias caused by multicollinearity.  
To examine whether multicollinearity affects our results, we also remove the variable of gasoline price 
from the estimated equation. As presented in Tables A-11 and A-12, the coefficients and significant 
levels for the variables remain, suggesting the robustness of our estimation with regard to 
multicollinearity. 
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Many studies have identified significant long-run and short-run relationships between 
commodity futures and spot prices; this article extends the analysis by investigating 
the price transmission across markets during bubble episodes. We find that bubbles 
seldom synchronise across futures and spot prices, even though the co-integration and 
Granger-causality relationships remain. Bubbles are more frequent in spot prices, 
while futures prices dominate the price discovery. Moreover, a non-linear 
transmission between futures and spot markets in the first and second moments of 
price returns is found through the Markov-switching error-correction model and the 
dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH model. The lack of immediate 
and linear transmission between co-integrated prices inhibits the synchronisation of 
bubbles. During the regimes with most bubbles, spot prices adjust slowly toward the 
long-run equilibrium. Own lagged terms of spot price returns more likely drive the 
spot prices, which may lead to more frequent bubbles in spot markets. Policy makers 
should pay more attention on the structure of spot markets, rather than merely 
restricting the positions of speculation in commodity futures markets.  
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3.1 Introduction  
Agricultural commodity prices have experienced rapid increases in the last decade. 
This has raised global concerns about bubbles of food price. Many people attribute the 
bubble phenomenon to aggressive financialization of agricultural futures markets 
(Master 2008, 2009, Basak and Pavlova 2016), arguing that too many institutional 
funds enter into futures contracts with long positions and drive the agricultural 
commodity prices up in the short run. This results in a wrong price expectation by 
commercial traders in futures markets, who aim to hedge against risk. Then, the 
mispricing effect in the futures market impacts spot markets and distorts physical 
trades and inventories. Although this argument is seemingly quite convincing, recent 
empirical studies find little evidence to support it (Sanders and Irwin 2017, Boyd et al. 
2018). Instead, increasing studies repeatedly find that the fundamental economic 
factors associated with price bubbles in various commodity (futures) markets are 
responsible (Gutierrez 2013, Etienne et al. 2014, 2015, Li et al. 2017). Despite the 
heated discussion on the role of the over-financialization of the commodity markets, 
the studies focusing on this only detect and analyse price bubbles for commodity 
futures price series. A particularly ignored issue is whether the spot market of a 
commodity shows similar and synchronous bubbles. If not, there may be different 
reasons or mechanisms behind the price bubbles in the futures and spot markets. This 
study seeks to close the research gap by identifying how futures prices affect spot 
prices during bubble periods. 
Futures markets serve important functions in price discovery and for hedging. Trading 
futures is supposed to speed up the homogenising process of traders’ common 
expectations of a future event. Evidence from experimental economics even shows 
that futures markets dampen, though do not eliminate, price bubbles (Porter and Smith 
2003). As for the relationship between futures and spot prices, the theory of storage 
by Kaldor (1939), Working (1948) and Telser (1958) predicts that the returns on 
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purchasing a commodity and selling it for delivery using futures contracts equals the 
interest forgone less the convenience yield net of the storage costs (Casassus et al. 
2013). Based on this theoretical framework and the present discounted value model 
(Campbell and Shiller 1987), Pindyck (1992) deduces a co-integration relationship 
between the futures and spot prices of a commodity. Using data from various 
commodity markets, numerous empirical studies have verified the long-run co-
integration relationship (Garbade and Silber 1983, Crain and Lee 1996, Mattos and 
Garcia 2004, Hernandez and Torero 2010). To date, this has become the common 
ground for studies on commodity markets; nearby futures prices are often used as a 
proxy for spot prices. Thus, in terms of the argument on commodity price bubbles, a 
seemingly plausible deduction is that bubbles would synchronise between the futures 
and spot markets. If bubbles are mainly caused by over-financialization in the futures 
market, these bubbles would be transmitted to the spot market almost simultaneously. 
However, there are two other points that call into question the direct transmission of 
bubbles across futures and spot markets. The first is the non-linearity of price 
transmission process across markets. Theoretically, the co-integration relationship 
indicates the underlying common stochastic trend between correlated price series 
(Engle and Granger 1987). If the commodity spot prices are regarded as lower (higher) 
than their expected future equilibrium, the futures prices are expected to increase 
(decrease) (Frankel 2014). This relationship is based on the hypothesis of linear 
transmission between futures and spot prices, but the immediate and linear 
transmission between co-integrated prices has long been challenged in real markets 
(Listorti and Esposti 2012; Loy et al. 2015, 2016).  
Moreover, some studies have theoretically proven that the co-integration relationship 
between prices remains even for bubbles that occur within one of the co-integrated 
price series (Engsted 2006, Magdalinos and Phillips 2009, Nielsen 2010). Alexakis et 
al. (2017) are one of the first to doubt the direct transmission of price bubbles within 
the context of the hog supply chain (hog, corn and soybeans). Based on the co-
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integration residuals among these three commodity prices, they find that the bubbles 
in feed prices and lack of associated bubbles in hog prices do not affect the long-run 
co-integration relationship and that the hog prices will even drag the other explosive 
price episodes back to normal. Esposti and Listorti (2013) consider price bubbles as 
exogeneous structural breaks, finding that price bubbles only have very limited effects 
on the co-integrated international and Italy domestic grain prices. Therefore, the non-
linear transmission effect may imply that the co-integrated price series would deviate 
from each other in a short period, allowing bubbles to take place. This raises our 
suspicion about the synchronisation of bubbles across the futures and spot prices, 
which to our knowledge has not been tested in previous empirical analysis. 
Another point is that price bubbles do not necessarily imply price spikes or drastic 
price changes (Stiglitz 1990, Meltzer 2002). There is more to a bubble than a drastic 
price change. Some other characteristics are relevant such as the volatility of prices 
(Greenwood et al. 2019). Phillips et al. (2012; 2015) develop a new technique to date-
stamp price bubbles, which has been widely accepted to detect price bubbles in 
various markets (Gutierrez 2013, Etienne et al. 2015, Engsted et al. 2016, Tsvetanov 
et al. 2016, Caspi and Graham 2018). Based on this new bubble testing method, a 
bubble period marks a temporary episode in which prices demonstrates an explosive 
root. Most studies using this method find that price bubbles do not always coincide 
with price spikes and do not even translate into drastic price changes. In the contrary, 
a price series with a relatively low volatility tends to have a narrow confidence 
interval for testing explosive roots and is more likely to have bubbles (Etienne et al. 
2017).  
The two points described above increase our doubts regarding the synchronisation of 
price bubbles across futures and spot markets. Any price changes within a limited 
extent will not directly affect the other price series in the case of non-linear 
transmission, especially when some of these price changes could be identified as 
bubbles. 
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Our paper is the first study to empirically analyse agricultural price transmission 
between futures and spot markets during bubble episodes. It aims to provide new 
insights into the formation of bubbles. We first detect the bubble dates and measure 
the degree of the bubbles’ synchronisation across the futures and spot markets of corn 
and soybeans in China. We also use the Markov-switching error-correction model 
(MSECM) to estimate the non-linear transmission effect and identify the 
characteristics of the regime with the most bubbles. Finally, we use the dynamic 
conditional correlation–multivariate GARCH (DCC-MGARCH) model to measure 
the dynamic volatility interdependence between the futures and spot prices by 
analysing market interactions in terms of the conditional second moments during 
bubble periods. 
Our estimation results indicate a very limited synchronisation of bubbles, and most 
bubbles occur only within the spot price series. Further analysis suggests a significant 
non-linear transmission across futures and spot prices. The leading role of futures 
prices becomes weak during frequent spot price bubbles. We find a strong persistence 
of spot price returns and a loose dynamic volatility interdependence across the futures 
and spot markets. The lack of immediate, linear transmission of first and second 
moments of co-integrated prices supports the idea of non-linear transmission, which 
inhibits the synchronisation of bubbles across futures and spot prices. As opposed to 
spot prices, futures prices have fewer bubbles and function better than spot prices in 
aggregating market information. This has also been shown by Yang et al. (2001), Will 
et al. (2013), Etienne et al. (2015), Li, Chavas, et al. (2017) and Boyd et al. (2018). 
Bubbles are more likely to occur in spot markets caused by their own persistence of 
price returns and their irresponsiveness to new information from futures markets.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 3.2 briefly introduces the bubble 
testing method. We use the MSECM model and the DCC-MGARCH model. Section 
3.3 describes the price data. Section 3.4 presents the main estimation results and 
section 3.5 summarises the paper and gives our conclusion. 




3.2.1 Bubble Testing Method 
A price bubble conventionally defines a situation in which an asset price cannot be 
justified by its fundamental value derived from the discounted expected payoff stream. 
The price is in excess of its fundamentals because investors believe the selling price to 
be higher tomorrow (Stiglitz 1990). This notion is widely accepted in the literature 
and applies to the case where asset prices and commodity prices might deviate from 
their intrinsic values based on market fundamentals (Tirole 1982, 1985, De Long et al. 
1990, Gutierrez 2013). The present fundamental value of an asset equals the 
discounted expected future payoffs (Blanchard and Watson 1982, Campbell and 
Shiller 1987, Brunnermeier 2008, Gürkaynak 2008). Pindyck (1992) further develops 
the present value model of rational commodity pricing, which uses convenience yields 
as future payoffs for storable commodities. Specifically, the current and future 
changes of commodity supply and demand cause changes in current and expected 
convenience yields. Hence, the present value model of commodity pricing presents a 
highly reduced form of a dynamic supply and demand model. If investors already 
know that the present price of an asset or commodity deviates from its fundamental 
value and investors are still buying or holding commodities to acquire the benefits 
from future sales, price bubbles are rational. The intertemporal no arbitrage condition 
always holds in the case of rational price bubbles, which implies a bubble to grow at a 
risk-free rate and to result an explosive root in the price series. 
This definition of price bubbles provides the basis for the right-tailed unit root test to 
detect bubbles (Diba and Grossman 1988). Price bubbles induce a temporary 
explosive root in price series. When price bubbles occur, the rational bubble 
component of prices is an explosive process, while the remaining part is a stationary 
or integrated process of order one at the most. Phillips et al. (2011, 2009) develop the 
right-tailed unit root test into a new forward recursive right-tailed Augmented Dickey-
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Fuller test (SADF), which suggests implementing the right-tailed Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test repeatedly on a forward expanding sample sequence and performing 
inference based on the supreme value of the corresponding ADF statistic sequence. 
A great advantage of the SADF test is that it can identify the beginning and end of a 
bubble. Homm and Breitung (2012) use extensive simulations to prove that the SADF 
test works satisfactorily for structural breaks by comparing with other bubble testing 
approaches (such as sequential Chow-tests and CUSUM tests), especially it can detect 
market exuberance induced by a variety of sources, such as speculation or the time-
varying discount factor. All of methods suffer from reduced power when detecting the 
periodically collapsing bubbles. To solve this problem, Phillips et al. (2012, 2015) 
propose an alternative approach named the generalized supreme ADF test (GSADF). 
Currently, the GASDF test has been widely accepted and used to detect bubbles in 
many markets, e.g. in stock markets (Caspi and Graham 2018, Hu and Oxley 2018), 
real estate markets (Anundsen et al. 2016, Engsted et al. 2016, Pavlidis et al. 2016), 
and energy markets (Tsvetanov et al. 2016, Caspi et al. 2018). Recently, many studies 
also try to apply this method to agricultural commodity markets (Gutierrez 2013, 
Etienne et al. 2015, Li, Li, et al. 2017). In the following, we give an introduction to 
the GSADF test. 
According to Phillips et al. (2015), the main idea of the GASDF method is to apply 
the ADF-test to sequential subsets (rolling window) of the whole sample. Suppose 
that the rolling window run from the 𝑟1
𝑡ℎ fraction of the total sample (T) to the 𝑟2
𝑡ℎ 
fractione, where 𝑟2 = 𝑟1 + 𝑟𝑤  and 𝑟𝑤 > 0  is the fractional window size of the 
regression. Equation (1) shows the empirical model: 





𝑖=1                             (1) 
k is the lag order. The number of observations in the model is 𝑇𝑊 = ⌊𝑇𝑟𝑤⌋, where⌊. ⌋ is 
the floor function (given the integer part of the argument). The ADF-statistic (t-ratio) 
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based on this regression is denoted as 𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1
𝑟2. The rolling regression of the repeated 
ADF-test is used for bubble detection using the subsamples of the data. The GSADF 
relies on the repeated estimation of the ADF model. It varies the endpoint of the ADF 
regression 𝑟2 from 𝑟0 (the minimum window width) to 1, and it allows the starting 
point 𝑟1 to change within a feasible range, that is, from 0 to 𝑟2−𝑟0. The GSADF-test 
statistic of 𝑟2 is then obtained as the supreme value of the corresponding ADF-statistic 
sequence (see Equation (2)). 
𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) = 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑟1∈[0,𝑟0]
𝑟2∈[𝑟0,1]{ 𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1
𝑟2}                                              (2) 
The origination date of a bubble  ⌊𝑇𝑟𝑒⌋  is calculated as the first chronological 
observation with a GSADF-statistic above the critical value. The calculated 
origination date is denoted by ⌊𝑇𝑟?̂?⌋. The estimated termination date of a bubble ⌊𝑇𝑟?̂?⌋ 
is the first chronological observation after ⌊𝑇𝑟?̂?⌋ + 𝐿𝑇 with a GSADF-statistic below 
the critical value. The bubble duration must exceed the length of log(T). For the 
sample under study, we calculate log(460) = 2.66. Thus, the bubble duration should 
at least last 3 weeks.  
For the calculation of critical values for the GSADF method, Phillips et al. (2012) 
firstly propose to use the Monte Carlo simulations. However, Gutierrez (2013) and 
Harvey et al. (2016) find that the Monte Carlo method may incorrectly he potential 
structural breaks in the price series as price bubbles and the results of bubble detection 
will be quite severely over-sized. They propose to use the wild bootstrap method to 
calculate the critical values, which will consider the underlying structural break of the 
time series and thus find fewer but more accurate bubble days than the Monte Carlo 
method. In this paper, we adopt the wild bootstrap method. The number of iterations 
of wild bootstrapping is 2000 (Etienne et al. 2014, 2015, Phillips et al. 2015). 
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3.2.2 Vector Error Correction Models 
We proceed to test the co-integration relationship between the futures and spot price 
series for each commodity. When a co-integration relationship exists, the vector 
error-correction model (VECM) representation will be used to distinguish the long-
run and short-run interactions between the co-integrated price series. The VECM 
representation is listed as follows: 
△ 𝒑𝒕 = 𝜶𝜷
′𝒑𝒕−𝟏 + ∑ 𝜞𝒊 △𝒑𝒕−𝒊 + 𝜺𝒕
𝑚−1
𝑖=1                          (3), 




 is the (2 × 1) vector containing the spot and futures prices at 
time t. 𝜷 is the co-integration vector containing the long-run coefficients, and 𝜷′𝒑𝒕−𝟏 
represents the error-correction term (ECT). 𝜶 is the loading matrix containing the 
long-run adjustment coefficients of the error-correction term. 𝜞𝒊  is the matrix 
containing the coefficients that account for the short-run adjustment coefficients, and 
𝑚 is the lag length of the underlying vector autoregressive (VAR) model. 𝜺𝒕 is the 
matrix of white noise errors. As long as the co-integration relationship is maintained, 
the VECM representation would allow for temporary explosive roots in one price 
series (Engsted 2006, Magdalinos and Phillips 2009, Nielsen 2010). Therefore, we 
can still use equation (3) to model the relationship between the futures and spot prices, 
even when bubbles occur. 
Markov-Switching Error-Correction Model (MSECM) 
Already knowing the applicability of the VECM representation, we can use the 
MSECM to analyse the non-linearity of price transmission across the futures and spot 
prices. The MSECM assumes that the data-generating process underlying the state 
variable follows a Markov chain: 
𝛥𝑝𝑡
𝑠 = 𝜐𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠𝑡(𝜷
′𝒑𝒕−𝟏) + ∑ 𝜞𝑖,𝑠𝑡
𝑚−1
𝑖=1 𝛥𝒑𝒕−𝒊 + 𝑡                    (4), 




𝑠 is the spot price returns and the state variable 𝑠𝑡 represents the underlying 
state of the observation at time t. For the MSECM, the intercept term 𝜐𝑠𝑡, the loading 
parameter 𝛼𝑠𝑡 , and the short-run adjustment parameter 𝛤𝑖,𝑠𝑡  are all state dependent. 
The probability of switching to a new state depends only on the state of the one-step 
proceeding period, and a switching matrix will control the whole evolving process. 
Through the MSECM, we can identify the characteristics of the state where bubbles 
occur the most frequently. Further details about the Markov-switching model can be 
found in Hamilton (1994). 
3.2.3 Dynamic Conditional Correlation Multivariate GARCH Model (DCC-
MGARCH) 
The dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH model (DCC-MGARCH) 
measures the degree of volatility interdependence between futures and spot markets 
(Engle 2002). Through a dynamic conditional correlation matrix, it allows us to 
identify a time-varying volatility interdependence between the markets. Suppose that 
𝑯𝒕 is the conditional covariance matrix of 𝜺𝒕 in equation (3): 









2 )                                  (5), 





𝟐                                                          (6), 
where 𝑫𝒕 = (
𝜎11,𝑡 0
0 𝜎22,𝑡
), and 𝑹𝒕 = (
1 𝜌12,𝑡
𝜌12,𝑡 1
). For i = 1 and 2,  
𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑖𝑖.𝑡−1
2                                    (7), 











                                    (8), 
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where ?̃?,𝑡−𝑠  is the standardised error term, and 𝜆
𝑠  is the geometrical weight 
decreasing geometrically with time t. The dynamic process of 𝑹𝒕 is determined by the 







2                                       (9) 
𝑸𝒕 = (1 − 𝜆1 − 𝜆2)𝑹 + 𝜆1 ?̃?−1 ?̃?−1
′ + 𝜆2𝑸𝒕−𝟏                     (10) 
𝑹 is the mean of 𝑹𝒕. Thus, the entire dynamic process is determined by the parameters 
𝜆1  and 𝜆2 . If 𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 0 , the DCC model becomes the constant conditional 
correlation model (CCC-MGARCH), and we can use a joint test for model selection.  
3.3 Data 
The present paper concentrates on the price bubbles on corn and soybeans commodity 
markets in China. China has a large, rigid and lasting demand for agricultural 
commodities, which affects domestic and international markets. The rising food 
consumption has profound effects on the world food balance and trade patterns and is 
often taken as the main source of global commodity price spikes (Coxhead and 
Jayasuriya 2010). China is also a major producer of corn and soybeans. Hernandez et 
al. (2014) verified the dynamic international interlinkage between China and many 
international markets. It is important for China to maintain its food safety and stable 
agricultural commodity markets. 
Corn and soybeans show high trade volumes on international markets. We collect 
weekly price data (Monday) from two datasets. The sample period is from January 4th 
2009 to December 31st 2017, including 460 observations. We first obtain the National 
Wholesale Price Index of each commodity as the spot price. This index is compiled 
by the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd., which collects the price data of agricultural 
commodities from major markets nationwide. The wholesale price mainly reflects 
large wholesalers’ trades. Large wholesalers may have strong market power that 
affects the supply chain and its price structures and relationships (Nakamura and 
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Zerom 2010). Futures prices come from the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE), 
which is the most important futures exchange for agricultural commodities in China. 
We use nearby futures contract prices. Specifically, each commodity has six futures 
contracts every year, namely the contracts starting in January, March, May, July, 
September and November. All futures contracts last for 12 months, not including the 
delivery month. The price series of the last two months for each contract build the 
nearby futures price. We use the logarithmic transformation of prices. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Bubble Testing Results 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of price returns (log(𝑃𝑡 𝑃𝑡−1⁄ )) . The 
futures price returns exhibit a higher absolute mean value for both commodities. The 
comparison of the maximum (minimum) values and standard deviations suggest that 
the futures price returns have a larger amplitude and volatility than spot prices. The 
kurtosis for all markets exceeds three, indicating a leptokurtic distribution. The results 
of the Jarque-Bera test further show that price returns do not follow a normal 
distribution. Given these results, a t-student distribution is considered for the 
estimation of the DCC-MGARCH model to solve the non-normality problem.  




Table 3.1  Summary statistics for daily price returns 
 Corn  Soybeans  
 Futures Spot Futures Spot 
Statistics     
Mean*100a 0.0153 0.0148 -0.0156 0.0048 
Median*100a 0.0000 0.0550 0.0196 0.0139 
Maximum 0.0940 0.0091 0.0474 0.0405 
Minimum -0.0667 -0.0322 -0.0465 -0.0465 
Std. Dev. 0.0112 0.0040 0.0091 0.0062 
Skewness 0.2549 -2.4111 -0.1729 -0.3622 
Kurtosis 21.2756 15.7235 6.9729 22.0747 
Jarque-Bera 6392.6870 3540.8044 304.1487 6968.5786 
q-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of obs 460 460 460 460 
a Mean and median values are multiplied by 100.  
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 
We proceed to use the GSADF method to detect bubbles in each price series. The 
futures and spot prices indicate different bubble episodes shown in Figures 3.1 and 
3.2, even though they are co-integrated with each other. Regardless of the commodity 
species, the spot price has more frequent and longer bubble episodes than the 
corresponding futures price. In the case of corn, 73 of 460 weeks (15.87 %) indicate 
bubbles for the spot price, while only 7 of 460 weeks (1.52 %) show bubbles for the 
futures price. Importantly, the corn futures price shows two short bubble episodes and 
only one of them coincides with a bubble episode of the spot price. In the case of 
soybeans, 54 of 460 weeks (11.73 %) show bubbles for the spot price, while only 10 
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of 460 weeks (2.17 %) for the futures price. Again, we only find one overlapping 
bubble episode. Table A-1 and A-2 in the Appendix present more details. 
 
Figure 3.1 Corn: Price Bubble Periods for the Futures and Spot Prices 
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 
 
Figure 3.2 Soybeans: Price Bubble Periods for the Futures and Spot Prices 
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 
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We apply another measure to quantify the degree of bubble synchronisation across 
two price series. When estimating the degree of price synchronisation and staggering 
among different prices, prior studies compare the standard deviations of the actual 
proportion of price changes in each period with the standard deviations of perfect 
price synchronisation or staggering (Fisher and Konieczny 2000, Loy and Weiss 
2002). We use this method to measure the degree of bubble synchronisation and 
staggering across different price series. If the bubbles for futures and spot prices were 
perfectly staggered, we would expect the proportion of bubble occurrences in any 
period would be equal to the average proportion of bubbles over time. However, if the 
bubbles are perfectly synchronised, the proportion of bubbles in any period would be 
either 0 or 1. For instance, the number of corn (futures and spot) price bubbles is 76 
out of 460 observations. In this case, assuming perfect synchronisation, the standard 
deviation is computed from a series of 76 ones and 384 zeros. Table 3.2 shows the 
main result of the standard deviations for these three cases. The final row of 
‘differences from perfect staggering’ indicates the extent of deviation from perfect 
staggering. When this term is below 50 %, the actual data are closer to the perfect 
staggering situation.1 As will be seen in Table 3.2, even though there are no bubbles 
within most observations (384 weeks, 83.5 % of the sample observations) for both the 
corn futures and spot prices, we find that the deviation from perfect staggering is still 
below 50 %. The same applies to the case of soybeans. This further proves that the 
bubbles for futures and spot prices hardly synchronise with each other.  
                                                 
1  When more individual price series are available, a formal 𝜒2  test could be used to judge the 
significance level of the deviation from perfect staggering formally. 




Table 3.2 Comparing standard deviations of different cases 
Standard Deviation Corn Soybeans 
In actual data 0.2009 0.1852 
Assuming perfect staggering a 0.1859 0.1686 
Assuming perfect synchronisation a 0.3718 0.3371 
Difference from perfect staggering b 8.0689% 9.8516% 
a The standard deviations are calculated from the actual number of bubbles for each commodity. 
b Calculated as (𝜎𝑠𝑡 − 𝜎𝑑) (𝜎𝑠𝑡 − 𝜎𝑠𝑦) ∗ 100%⁄ , where 𝜎𝑑 , 𝜎𝑠𝑡  and 𝜎𝑠𝑦  are the standard deviations in the data, the standard 
deviation under the assumption of perfect staggering, and the standard deviation under the assumption of perfect synchronisation, 
respectively.  
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 
Spot prices have more frequent and persistent bubbles than the futures prices. The 
comparison between the bubble episodes of different prices indicates that the bubbles 
rarely synchronise across futures and spot prices. This is inconsistent with the 
intuition that co-integrated futures and spot prices should show similar bubble periods. 
We further explore the relationship between the futures and spot prices for 
agricultural commodities during the bubble periods. 
3.4.2 Price Transmission and Bubble Occurrences under Different Regimes  
We start with basic tests of time series properties for all price series. The results of the 
ADF-test and KPSS-test in Table 3.3 indicate that the price series are integrated of 
order one (I(1)) and become stationary after first differencing. Table 3.4 presents the 
estimation results of the co-integration and Granger-causality tests. Futures and spot 
prices are co-integrated for both commodities, indicating a long-run equilibrium 
relationship. Based on the results of the Granger-causality tests, the null hypothesis 
that futures price returns do not Granger-cause spot price returns is rejected for corn 
and soybeans. The lagged values of futures price returns predict spot price returns. 
Thus, information and shocks move from the futures to the spot markets. These 
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results are consistent with previous studies (Garbade and Silber 1983, Crain and Lee 
1996, Mattos and Garcia 2004, Hernandez and Torero 2010). The futures market 
discovers prices and transmits to the sport markets. These results, however, contradict 
the finding that spot markets indicate a much higher rate of bubbles compared to the 
futures markets. 
Table 3.3 Unit Root Tests 
 Corn:  Soybeans: 












P-value 0.0100 0.0100  0.0100 0.0100 
 












P-value 0.1000 0.1000  0.1000 0.1000 
a The autocovariance function is to be weighted by the quadratic spectral kernel. Automatic bandwidth selection procedure 
proposed by Newey and West (Newey and West 1994) is applied here.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15.  




Table 3.4 Co-integration Test and Granger Causality Test 
  
  Trace Test 
Johansen Co-integration Test: 
(5% critical values in the parentheses) 
   
r0 r1 
Corn: Futures and Spot Prices 





Soybeans: Futures and Spot Prices 





      
Granger-causality tests: 
H0 is the null hypothesis. (P-value in the parentheses) 
    
F-statistics 












H0: Soybean Futures Price Returns do not Granger-cause Spot Price Returns   
2.5440** 
(0.0276) 
a indicates the accepted rank by Johansen Test. 
*** statistically significant at 1% confidence level; **statistically significant at 5% confidence level; * statistically significant at 
10% confidence level. 
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15.  
We adopt the MSECM to estimate the state where bubbles are most likely to occur. If 
bubbles are mainly attributed to the futures market, more bubbles would occur during 
the state where the futures price has strong and significant adjustment effects on the 
spot price. We document the estimated results of the model in Table 3.5. 
In the case of corn, three regimes are identified based on Akaike’s information criteria 
(AIC) and could be named as the ‘normal’, ‘adjustment’ and ‘no adjustment’ states, 
contingent on the degree of adjustment effect of the error-correction term in each 
regime. Moreover, concerning the distribution of bubbles among these three states, 71 
of 73 spot price bubble days (97.2603%) are within the ‘normal’ (45, 61.6438%) and 
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‘no adjustment’ (26, 35.6164%) states. In other words, the ‘normal’ state and ‘no 
adjustment’ state could also be named as the ‘bubble’ state. 
Specifically, the ‘normal’ state is characterised by a relatively small though 
significant coefficient value (-0.0462) of the error-correction term. This suggests that 
the spot price adjusts slowly to the long-term equilibrium in this state. Meanwhile, the 
average value of the error-correction term during this state is -0.0004, and its absolute 
value is the lowest when compared with the other two states, indicating a small 
deviation (on average) from the equilibrium. More importantly, the sum of the 
coefficients on the lagged spot price returns is 0.4695, implying a strong persistence 
of the spot price returns during the ‘normal’ state.  
Compared with the ‘normal’ state, the ‘adjustment’ state is characterised by almost a 
three-fold increase in the coefficient value (-0.1655) of the error-correction term. It 
also corresponds to the largest average error-correction value (0.0088), indicating that 
the adjustment effect of the corn spot price toward the long-run equilibrium is the 
strongest in this regime. Meanwhile, both the coefficients of the lagged futures price 
returns and lagged spot price returns are significant, suggesting strong short-run 
effects of futures price returns on spot price returns. 
Finally, the ‘no adjustment’ state is characterised by the insignificant coefficient value 
(-0.0277) of the error-correction term. The effects of lagged futures price returns on 
spot price returns are also insignificant. Thus, the futures price has lost the leadership 
in this regime, and the spot price returns are mainly affected by their own lagged 
terms. 
As for the estimated results for soybeans, we find almost the same long-run and short-
run effects as corn. Fifty-one of 54 (94.4444%) spot price bubble days are within the 
‘normal’ (50, 92.5926%) and ‘no adjustment’ (1, 0.0002%) states. These results 
indicate that the adjustment effect of spot prices toward the long-run equilibrium 
becomes weak when spot price bubbles occur the most frequently. The bubbles in the 
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spot price are not mainly caused by shocks from the futures market. Instead, the spot 
price returns have shown significant persistence in their own lagged terms. This 
implies that the spot price can hardly adjust to a new market clear price level when 
responding to changes in the futures price. Once a trend is established, it is more 
likely to continue in that direction than to move against or opposite the trend. This is 
consistent with previous studies that find a difference between the commodity spot 
and futures markets in the ability to incorporate relevant price information (Crain and 
Lee 1996, Yang and Leatham 1999, Yang et al. 2001). The stronger self-persistence 
of price returns may have resulted in more bubbles for the spot price series. 
Another possible explanation for the autocorrelated price returns in spot markets is the 
theory of informational cascades by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Welch (1992). 
The core idea of the informational cascades is similar to price bubbles. Specifically, 
the current traders in a market obtain information by observing their previous traders’ 
decisions to the point where they optimally and rationally ignore their own private 
information (Devenow and Welch 1996). In this case, current traders rationally herd 
after observing previous traders’ actions. The self-persistence observed in the spot 
price returns could be partly explained by this herding behaviour. Traders in the spot 
market rationally herd to expect a future sale to their ensuing traders. In this case, spot 
markets are less efficient compared with futures markets. 
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Table 3.5 Results of Markov-switching Error Correction Model (3 states) 
  Corn    Soybeans  
 𝛥𝑝𝑠 Regime:   𝛥𝑝𝑠 Regime:  
 Normal Adjustment No 
adjustment 
 Normal Adjustment No 
adjustment 
N a 330(45) 16(2) 111(26)  400(50) 25(3) 31(1) 









































































































a the number of bubbles are included in the parentheses. 
b the standard deviations are included in the parentheses. 
*** statistically significant at 1% confidence level; **statistically significant at 5% confidence level; * statistically significant at 
10% confidence level. The number of states and lags of price returns are determined by information criteria (AIC). 
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 
  




As Table 3.1 presents, the futures price is more volatile than the corresponding spot 
price. If the two price series are co-integrated, this difference in volatility may 
account for some differences in the frequencies of bubbles. Price volatility is also 
important for the GSADF method of bubble detection, and different volatilities could 
result in different bubble episodes, even for price series with similar movement. We 
then use the dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH model (DCC-
MGARCH) to investigate the dynamic volatility interdependence between futures and 
spot prices.  
In Table 3.6, for both corn and soybeans, the spot price shows a significant volatility 
clustering effect (significant ARCH 𝑎𝑖  and GARCH 𝑏𝑖  parameters), while the 
volatility of futures prices tends to be constant over the sample period. Regarding the 
dynamic volatility correlation, 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 can be interpreted as the ‘news’ and ‘decay’ 
parameters, which represent the effect of innovations on the conditional correlations 
over time and their persistence. For corn, 𝜆1 is small and not significant, while 𝜆2 is 
close to 1 and highly significant, suggesting a slow decaying rate. For soybeans, the 
Wald joint test shows that 𝜆1  and 𝜆2  jointly insignificantly differ from zero, 
suggesting a constant conditional correlation between soybeans futures and spot price 
volatilities. We then estimate a constant conditional correlation multivariate GARCH 
model (CCC-MGARCH), and the value of the constant conditional correlation is 
0.1304.  
We further measure the extent to which the conditional volatilities correlate in time, 
especially during bubble episodes. From Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we can see that the 
predicted conditional variance of the corn spot price is always lower than the variance 
of futures prices. The time-variant volatility correlation is between -0.02 and 0.02. 
The spot price has shown to be relatively independent and with a lower volatility. The 
degree of volatility interdependence across the markets does not increase during 
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bubble episodes. Particularly, there is a negative conditional correlation during the 
overlapped bubble episode. Similar results apply to the case of soybeans, as shown in 
Figure 3.5 and 3.6, except that the soybeans spot price volatility becomes higher 
around July 2015.2 However, this does not result in a tighter correlation between 
volatilities during that period.  
Therefore, the volatility interdependency between futures and spot markets is very 
limited. Combined with the results of the MSECM, bubbles occur more easily within 
the price series with a higher self-persistence of returns and lower volatility. This may 
imply that spot prices have a lower capacity to aggregate and respond to new 
information. Nonetheless, this does not mean that a higher volatility is desirable for 
commodity markets. Instead, our estimation results, which are based on weekly data, 
show that when information is efficiently incorporated into the price, a certain degree 
of volatility should reflect market efficiency to some extent, and much lower volatility 
may reflect the market inability to respond to new information quickly. In our case, 
this means an incomplete response of the spot market to changes in futures prices.  
                                                 
2 To keep consistency and comparability, we continue to use the estimation results from the DCC-
MAGRCH model for soybeans for Figures 3.5 and 3.6. 
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Wald joint test for adjustment coefficients (𝐻0: 𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 0)   
Chi-squared 5577.5500  0.2100  --  
p-value 0.0000  0.9002  --  
𝑎𝑖 stands for the arch term and 𝑏𝑖 stands for the garch term. Lagged terms are selected based on AIC. 
*** statistically significant at 1% confidence level; **statistically significant at 5% confidence level; * statistically significant at 
10% confidence level. 
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 




Figure 3.3 Variance Prediction for Futures Price and Spot Price (Corn) 
 Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 
 
Figure 3.4 Dynamic Conditional Correlation Between Futures Price and Spot 
Price (Corn) 
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 




Figure 3.5 Variance Prediction for Futures Price and Spot Price (Soybeans) 
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Dynamic Conditional Correlation Between Futures Price and Spot 
Price (Soybeans) 
Source: own calculations based on data from DCE and the China Grain Reserves Group, Ltd. using Stata 15. 
 




In this paper, we first identify the bubble dates for the two highly traded agricultural 
commodities in China, corn and soybeans. Bubble episodes in the futures and spot 
price series are compared with each other. We do not find significant transmission or 
synchronisation of bubbles across the two markets. The spot price series shows more 
frequent and durable bubbles than the futures prices. This is contrary to the inference 
that price bubbles are caused by over-financialization in agricultural futures markets 
and then are transmitted to spot markets. 
We proceed to use the MSECM method to capture the nonlinear price transmission 
across the futures and spot markets, identifying the regime where spot price bubbles 
are most likely to occur. There is a weak adjustment effect of the spot price towards 
the long-run equilibrium during that regime. Meanwhile, the spot price indicates a 
strong self-persistence of its returns. We further adopt the DCC-MGARCH model to 
analyse the volatility interdependence, the estimation results of which indicate that the 
futures and spot prices have a very loose dynamic volatility interdependence. 
Therefore, bubbles occur more easily for the price series with a higher self-persistence 
of returns and lower volatility. This further implies a poor ability of the spot market to 
adjust itself to a new equilibrium.  
Our results help in understanding the formation of price bubbles in agricultural 
commodity markets, highlighting the nonlinear transmission across futures and spot 
markets in the first and second moments of price returns. Previous studies on 
agricultural price bubbles have mostly ignored spot market factors and agricultural 
commodity futures markets have been blamed for the potentially negative effects of 
over-financialization. Our findings are remarkable considering the limited 
synchronisation of bubbles across agricultural futures and spot markets. The self-
persistence of spot price returns during certain regimes may have resulted in more 
frequent and durable bubble episodes for spot prices. Instead of merely focusing on 
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the over-financialization or speculation in futures markets, the current paper has 
suggested that the factors with the potential to contribute to the persistence of price 
returns in the spot market, such as information cascades and market power, should be 
considered in future relevant studies. 
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Table 3.7 A-1: Summary of Price Bubbles for Corn 
 
   Bubbles for Spot Price   Bubbles for Futures Price 
Bubble Periods Length(weeks) Start Peak(Trough) End 
%Price 
Change(Start to 
Peak or Trough) 
%Price Change 
(Peak or Trough 
to End) 
 Start Peak(Trough) End 
%Price 
Change(Start 




or Trough to 
End) 
2009/07/05-2009/10/04 14 106.51 115.06 115.06 8.03% 0.00%       
2010/01/03-2010/01/17 3       112.69 113 112.97 0.28% -0.03% 
2010/05/09-2010/06/13 6 121.7 127.02 126.1 4.37% -0.72%       
2011/05/11-2011/10/09 24 137.88 155.55 155.55 12.82% 0.00%       
2012/03/25-2012/05/20 9 149.14 154.07 154.07 3.31% 0.00%       
2014/06/29-2014/09/14 12 157.18 167.02 166.91 6.26% -0.07%       
2014/08/03-2014/08/24 4       161.97 165.88 165.88 2.41% 0.00% 
2015/09/20-2015/10/18 5 140.9 129.11 129.11 -8.37% 0.00%       
2017/02/12-2017/02/26 3 98.42 97.19 97.19 -1.25% 0.00%       
Sum 73 weeks(15.87%)       7 weeks(1.52%)    
Maximum Single Bubble  24  weeks             4 weeks         
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Table 3.8 A-2: Summary of Price Bubbles for Soybeans 
 
   Bubbles for Spot Price   Bubbles for Futures Price 
Bubble Periods Length(weeks) Start Peak(Trough) End 
%Price 
Change(Start to 
Peak or Trough) 
%Price Change 
(Peak or Trough to 
End) 
 Start Peak(Trough) End 
%Price 
Change(Start to 
Peak or Trough) 
%Price Change 
(Peak or Trough 
to End) 
2009/12/27-2010/01/10 3       4054 4162 4162 2.66% 0.00% 
2010/06/20-2010/07/18 5 95.57 94.87 94.99 -0.73% 0.13%             
2010/10/31-2010/11/14 3             4092 4244 4164 3.71% -1.89% 
2012/05/27-2012/06/10 3 107.97 108.15 108.01 0.17% -0.13%             
2012/07/29-2012/09/16 8 111.38 116.96 116.96 5.01% 0.00%             
2012/09/30-2012/11/11 7 116.94 120.59 120.59 3.12% 0.00%             
2012/12/02-2013/05/19 23 120.61 124.5 125.15 3.23% 0.52%             
2013/03/31-2013/04/21 4             4996 5032 5004 0.72% -0.56% 
2015/03/22-2015/05/24 8 104.74 90.62 90.62 -13.48% 0.00%       
Sum 54 weeks (11.73%)       10 weeks(2.17%)    
Maximum Single Bubble 
Duration 




      4 weeks         
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For the corn, 73 of 460 weeks (15.87 %) indicate bubbles for the spot price, while only 7 of 
460 weeks (1.52 %) show bubbles for the futures price. The overlapped episode between corn 
futures and spot price bubbles is from 08th August 2014 to 24th August 2014 (four weeks). For 
the soybeans, 54 of 460 weeks (11.73 %) show bubbles for the spot price, while only 10 of 
460 weeks (2.17 %) for the futures price. The overlapped episode between soybean futures 
and spot price bubbles is from 31st March 2013 to 21st April 2013 (four weeks). Regardless of 
the commodity species, the futures and spot price bubbles seldom synchronise, neither do they 
indicate a significant lead-lag relationship.  
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By introducing a bubbly factor into the growth process of firms, this paper constructs a 
theoretical model to explain the effect of bubbles on the economy. Our model indicates that, 
in the presence of financial frictions and productivity differentials, bubbles can act as a 
financial intermediation to transfer money from investors to productive firms. Hence, the 
productive firms can expand production and the output of the economy would grow through 
bubble trades. Moreover, in comparison with previous models based on the framework of 
overlapping-generations, our model relaxes the assumption of agents’ finite survival periods 
and is useful to interpret the effects of bubbles on the economy in terms of calendar time. 
Infinitely lived agents rationally hold bubbles in their portfolios because holding the bubbles 
issued by productive firms could give them higher expected returns. 
JEL: E32, E37, G12, G17 
Key words: Economic Growth; Bubbles; Firm Size, Yule-Simon distribution  




Bubbles have long been considered as the hallmark of market failure (Brunnermeier and 
Oehmke 2013). During the bubble periods, many countries have witnessed dramatic 
fluctuations in asset prices and economic output (Jordà et al. 2015, Miao et al. 2015). The 
origin of bubbles and their effects on economic development have long been discussed and no 
consensus has been reached. Scholars feel the need to develop new models to explain what 
drives asset price bubbles and how they affect the macroeconomy (Martin and Ventura 2018).  
In this paper, we ask the same questions as previous studies. What is the origin of bubbles? 
Why they raise the output of the economy? How do they collapse and affect the economy? 
Current discussions concerning these questions mainly focus on the theoretical model of 
rational bubbles (Blanchard and Watson 1982, Tirole 1982, 1985, Olivier 2000, Abreu and 
Brunnermeier 2003, Martin and Ventura 2012, Miao and Wang 2018, Martin and Ventura 
2018). Although these models have incorporated many important insights of bubbles and 
explained possible effects of bubbles on the economy, there are some unsolved issues on the 
theoretical modelling of bubbles, one of which is the infinite lived periods for agents (Miao 
2014).  
Our study builds on a series of studies that assume financial frictions and productivity 
differentials in the economy (Kocherlakota 2009, 2008; Martin and Ventura 2012; Miao and 
Wang 2012; Miao, Wang, and Zhou 2015; Miao and Wang 2018). In comparison with 
previous models, our model aims to relax the assumption of finite survival periods for agents, 
which is commonly shared by the overlapping-generations (OLG) models for bubbles. Our 
model might also provide a framework for empirical tests of bubbles’ origin and their effects 
on the economy, due to that agents in our model correspond to the investors and firms in the 
economy. Meanwhile, the introduction of stochastic process could relax the propositions of 
bubble collapse. This enables us to avoid the criticism of periodically collapsing bubbles by 
Evans (1991). 
In what follows, we provide a literature review on the theoretical models of bubbles in 
Section 4.2. Section 4.3 gives a brief introduction on the stochastic process of firm growth. In 
Section 4.4, we present our model of bubbles and explain the dynamic process of bubble 
trades. We further make a simulation of our model in Section 4.5. Conclusions are 
summarized in Section 4.6.  
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4.2 Literature Review 
We first make a brief review on the theoretical models of bubbles and then summarize the 
studies on the effects of bubbles. We confine our attention to the models based on rational 
bubbles. By using the term of ‘rational’, we mean agents have rational expectations and 
maximize their expected revenues by holding bubbles in their portfolios.  
The deduction of rational bubbles starts with the present discounted value (PDV) model 
(Blanchard and Watson 1982, Kamihigashi 2006, Gürkaynak 2008, Miao 2014). The asset 
price is derived from the customers’ dynamic optimization process. In an intertemporal 
competitive equilibrium without market frictions, the asset price bubbles are ruled out by the 
Euler equation and transversality condition. The Euler equation means no deviation from the 
optimal price path at any single period and the transversality condition means that the 
terminal point of the optimal price path is fixed. In the case of infinite lived agents, any 
violation of these two conditions would allow the occurrence of bubbles. Detailed 
mathematical expression of Euler equation and transversality condition is available in the 
study of Kamihigashi (2006) and Gürkaynak (2008). 
Nevertheless, for finite lived agents, scholars use the framework of OLG model and find that 
bubbles are likely to occur in both exchange economy and production economy (Samuelson 
1958, Diamond 1965, Tirole 1985). For instance, the existence of fiat money can be well 
explained by the OLG model in a pure exchange economy. Fiat money without intrinsic value 
can be considered as bubbles to store value across overlapping generations. The main 
advantage of the OLG model is the relax of transversality condition. The finite survival 
periods of agents fail to eliminate the arbitrage opportunity of bubble holders. Moreover, for a 
production economy with overlapping generations, Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985) show 
that when inefficient investment caused by over capital cumulation occurs, bubbles would 
absorb the inefficient investment and improve the dynamic efficiency of the economy.  
In addition, if the hypotheses of market frictions and/or incomplete markets are incorporated 
into the model setting, it would be optimal for rational agents to hold bubbles in their 
portfolios. Santos and Woodford (1997) establish market conditions for pure exchange 
economy under which asset bubbles cannot exist. These conditions are summarized by Miao 
(2014) as follows: Each agent is subject to borrowing constraints such that he cannot borrow 
more than the present value of his future endowments; The present value of aggregate 
endowments is finite; The asset is either of finite maturity or in positive net supply. If any of 
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these three conditions is violated, an asset bubble might arise in the economy with rational 
agents.   
The economic consequence of bubbles is also critical. Bubbles are often considered as market 
failure and distort normal market trades and resource allocations (Stiglitz 1990). The models 
mentioned above show that bubbles could act as a tool of storing value, when there is an 
inefficient investment chain in the economy (Samuelson 1958, Diamond 1965, Tirole 1985). 
This means that the implicit interest rate in the bubbleless equilibrium is less than the rate of 
economic growth, or the bubbleless equilibrium is dynamically inefficient (Gale 1973). 
Nonetheless, these models cannot explain the associated fluctuations of output and investment 
with bubbles (Brunnermeier and Oehmke 2013). 
More recent theoretical studies on bubbles show that incomplete markets with bubbles could 
have various effects on the economic output and capital accumulation. Binswanger (1999) 
proposes a new role of speculative bubbles in the stock market: provided they are sustainable, 
bubbles may have a positive effect on the market. According to the bubble equivalence 
theorem proposed by Kocherlakota (2008; 2009), the introduction of a bubble gives agents a 
windfall, proportional to their initial holdings of the asset, which can lead to a more efficient 
allocation of physical capital among firms with good projects. Under the assumption of 
borrowing constraints, Oliver (2000), Martin and Ventura (2012) use the OLG framework to 
construct new models and explain the bubbles’ potential effect on the economic growth.   
For more details on the theoretical models of bubbles, Miao (2014) has made a 
comprehensive review of the models based on OLG framework. In summary, though a lot of 
insights can be derived from the OLG model with two-period lived agents (Tirole 1985, 
Olivier 2000, Martin and Ventura 2012), Miao (2014) points out that it is difficult to interpret 
the period in the OLG framework as calendar time and it is also difficult to do empirical tests 
with economic data.  
Therefore, if infinite-horizons are allowed for agents in the model of bubbles, many other 
insights can be available. In this paper, we construct a new theoretical model to explain the 
associated fluctuations of economic output with bubbles. We firstly assume productivity 
differentials among firms and financial frictions in the economy. Then, we use the stochastic 
process of firm growth to interpret the effects of bubbles on the economic output.  




We consider an economy with different industries and let the firm in an industry follow the 
Gibrat’s law, that is the expected value of the individual growth ratio for a firm is independent 
of the firm size (using output volume to measure firm size).1 Suppose there is a minimum size 
𝑆0, a firm below the size 𝑆0 has an increasing unit cost with its size (Simon and Bonini 1958). 
The size of firm 𝑖 at the end of the tth period is 𝑆𝑖𝑡. Following Ijiri and Simon (1967), we 
assume that there are N firms in an industry and firm i has a growing process:  
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝜌?̅? ∙ 𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1), where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝜌?̅? 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1, 2, 3, … , 𝑇               (1) 
The 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is called the growth rate of the ith firm in the tth period and can be decomposed into 
two factors: one is a growth factor applicable to firm i only (the individual growth factor), 𝜌𝑖𝑡; 
and the other one is a growth factor that affects equally all firms in the same industry (the 
industry growth factor), 𝜌?̅?. 𝜌𝑖𝑡 is the residual of the ith firm’s growth that has taken place in 




that is, the industry growth factor is equal to the ratio of the size of the industry in current 
period to its size in previous period. Then 𝜌𝑖𝑡 is a measure of the change in the ith firm’s share 
of market in the industry. 𝜌𝑖𝑡 = 1 means that the ith firm has grown just rapidly enough to 
retain its share of market. When the number of firms in the industry is relatively large, the 
statistical dependence of the average growth ratio on any individual growth factor will be too 
slight to bias significantly the estimates of parameters of the model. Equation (1) indicates 
that the individual growth factor is independent of the size of firm i or other firms, which 
means it follows the Gibrat’s law. 
Equation (1) iterates backward and the size of firm i at period t becomes: 




𝜏=1 )𝑆𝑖0                                                     (2) 
Both sides of equation (2) take logarithm: 
log𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜌𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1 + ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜌?̅?
𝑡
𝜏=1 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖0                                     (3) 
From equation (3), the size of the firm i in an industry is decomposed into three sets of factors. 
The first term in the right hand of equation (3) reflects the history of individual growth rate 
                                                 
1 For the measure of firm size, the output, sales, assets, numbers of employees, value added, or profits could be 
used as indicators(Simon and Bonini 1958). 
Chapter 4 Economic Growth, Bubbles, and Firm Size Distribution  
107 
 
(idiosyncratic shocks) for firm i. The second term is the history of the industry’s growth rate 
and the final term is the initial size of firm i at t=0.  
Suppose that both the initial size 𝑆𝑖0  and the industry growth rate 𝜌?̅?  are given for τ =
1, 2, 3, … , t. Then the size of firm i is determined by the idiosyncratic changes of individual 
growth rate 𝜌𝑖𝜏 . The 𝜌𝑖𝜏  is further assumed to satisfy the Gibrats’ law and a single period 
Markov process, namely: 
𝜌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡𝜌𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝛼                                                              (4) 
where α ∈ [0,1) is a constant and 
𝜌𝑖1 = 𝑖1                                                                       (5) 
The individual growth rate of firm i in the tth period is the product of some power of the 
growth ratio 𝜌𝑖(𝑡−1) of the same firm in the (t-1)th period and a random component 𝑖𝑡. 𝑖𝑡 
follows an independently and identically distribution in each period for firm i, and log 𝑖𝑡 has 
zero mean and variance 𝜎2. In the same industry, 𝜌𝑖𝑡 is also determined independently from 
other firms. Other factors that commonly affect more than one firm are absorbed in the 
industry growth rate 𝜌?̅?. For the parameter α, it is assumed to be in the range [0,1), namely an 
individual growth rate in one period will have decaying effects on the individual growth rates 
in the subsequent periods.  
Substitute equation (4) and (5) into log𝜌𝑖𝑡, we have: 
log𝜌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜌𝑖(𝑡−1)
= ∑ 𝛼𝑡−𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1











= (1 + 𝛼 + 𝛼2⋯+ 𝛼𝑇−1)𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖1 + (1 + 𝛼 + 𝛼
2⋯+ 𝛼𝑇−2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖2







     (7) 
Thus, equation (3) becomes, 







𝜏=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖𝜏 + ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜌?̅?
𝑡
𝜏=1 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖0                        (8) 





𝜏=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖𝜏                                                         (9) 
Thus, under the Gibrat’s law and a single period Markov process of individual growth rate, 
the size of firm i follows a random process and its growth rate is independent from its current 
size. In the next section, we would introduce the bubble trades between firms and investors in 
the economy. 
4.4 Economic Growth and Bubbles  
We first introduce the conventional form of rational bubbles and then introduce bubbles into 
the economy described above.  
4.4.1 Bubble Trades 
A bubble is a situation in which an asset price doesn’t reflect its fundamental value and the 
reason the price is high today is only because investors believe that they could resell at an 
even higher price tomorrow (Stiglitz 1990, Gürkaynak 2008). Bubbles are akin to pyramid 
schemes (Ponzi games) and could start randomly without cost, giving the bubble sellers a 
windfall (Kocherlakota 2008; Martin and Ventura 2012). The mathematical expression of 
rational bubbles proposed by Blanchard and Watson (1982) is: 
𝐸(𝐵𝑡+1) = (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡                                                            (10) 
where r is the discount rate. The intertemporal no-arbitrage condition always holds for 
rational bubbles. Based on equation (10), Evan (1991) further developed a model of 
periodically collapsing bubbles,  
𝐵𝑡+1 = (1 + r)𝐵𝑡𝜗𝑡+1    𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑡 ≤ 𝐵0                                             (11a) 
𝐵𝑡+1 = [𝛿 + 𝜋
−1(1 + 𝑟)𝜃𝑡+1(𝐵𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟)
−1𝛿)]𝜗𝑡+1  𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑡 > 𝐵0        (11b) 
where  𝛿  and 𝐵0  are positive parameters with 0 < 𝛿 < (1 + r)𝐵0 , 𝜗𝑡+1  is an exogenous 
independently and identically distributed positive random variable with 𝐸𝑡(𝜗𝑡+1) = 1, and 
𝜃𝑡+1  is an independently and identically distributed Bernoulli process (independent of ϑ) 
which takes the value one with probability π and zero otherwise. The bubble would have a 
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fast growth rate of 𝜋−1(1 + 𝑟), when 𝐵𝑡 > 𝐵0 and 𝜃𝑡+1 = 1. If the 𝜃𝑡+1 takes the value of 
zero, the bubble would collapse. 
We assume that firms in the economy are confronted with borrowing constraints. The 
investors couldn’t achieve their optimal asset allocation under financial frictions, but they 
could earn a low return rate by self-investment on new firms, the size of which is below 𝑆0. 
Under this circumstance, the bubbles could serve as a financial intermediary to transfer the 
money from investors to firms.   
As aforementioned, there are two stages for a firm’s growth process. In the initial stage, firms 
with the size below the minimum size 𝑆0 are unproductive and have an increasing unit cost. 
However, for firms above the minimum size 𝑆0, the growth of them would follow the Gibrat’s 
law (equation (1)). The underlying stochastic growth model makes no reference to any feature 
of the cost curve, other than that unit cost is constant when the firm size is above some 
minimum point (Simon and Bonini 1958). This means that when obtaining new investments 
equally, firms below the minimum size tend to have lower expected output than those big 
firms (above the minimum size) and are at higher risk for investors.  
Therefore, investments on the firm with size above the minimum point are more likely to earn 
a relatively higher return. For a certain level of expected return rate by investors, the growth 
rate of firms with different sizes follows the binomial probability distribution: 
Pr(𝐷𝑡|𝐷𝑡 > 𝑟𝑡) = {
𝑃𝑠     𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑡 < 𝑠0
𝑃𝑏     𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑠0
                                           (12) 
where 𝑟𝑡  is the expected return rate required by investors at time t and 𝐷𝑡  is the expected 
return rate of investments on firms. It could be easily derived that 𝑃𝑠 < 𝑃𝑏 , due to that small 
and new firms are confronted with an increasing unit cost. For firms with different sizes, the 
probability of the growth rate being larger than the expected return rate 𝑟𝑡 is higher for the 
relatively big firms above the minimum size, as opposed to those small and new companies. 
For rational investors, they face up with this productivity and probability differentials when 
aiming to store value through their investments.   
Since bubbles start without costs, both big and small firms compete to create and sell bubbles, 
in order to obtain new investments. Moreover, the return rate of bubbles expected by investors 
would be linked to the expected growth rate of firms that sell the bubbles (Miao and Wang 
2012). As noted above, for a certain level of expected return rate required by investors, the big 
companies tend to achieve it with higher probability. Thus, the big companies would have an 
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advantage on issuing new bubbles. For instance, when a bubble 𝐵𝑡  is sold by firm i to 
investors, the firm will obtain new investment to expand its current size 𝑆𝑖𝑡, 
𝑆𝑖(𝑡+1) = 𝜌𝑖(𝑡+1)
𝐵 ∙ 𝜌𝑖(𝑡+1) ∙ 𝜌(𝑡+1)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑡                                          (13) 
where new investments through bubble trades are considered as a new growth factor 𝜌𝑖(𝑡+1)
𝐵  
for firm i. It contributes to the firm growth and is independent from individual growth rate 
𝜌𝑖(𝑡+1) . We assume that 𝜌𝑖(𝑡+1)
𝐵  follows a single period Markov process with a stochastic 
component and a new carry-over effect λ, λ ∈ [0,1), where λ represents the decaying effect of 
the new growth factor caused by bubbles. Suppose that the new growth factor 𝜌𝑖𝑡
𝐵  and the 
bubble Β𝑡 share the same stochastic component 𝜈𝑡, 
𝜌𝑖𝑡
𝐵 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡 ∙ (𝜌𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝐵 )
𝜆
                                                           (14) 









𝜏=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖𝜏 +∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜌?̅?
𝑡






𝜏=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜈𝑖𝜏                                                  (16) 
For an industry with N firms, we have: 





















𝑖=1                                                                                                   (17) 
Based on equation (11), 𝜌𝑖𝑡
𝐵  would experience a periodically collapsing process. Then,  
log𝜌𝑖𝑡





= ∑ [ I(𝐵𝜏 ≤ 𝐵0) ∙  𝜆
𝑡−𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜐𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1 + I(𝐵𝜏 > 𝐵0) ∙ 𝜆
𝑡−𝜏𝜋−1𝜃𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜐𝑖𝜏]
                   (18) 
where I(∙) is an indicator variable, and it equals to one if the condition is fulfilled, otherwise it 
would be zero. Substitute (18) into (15), we have 













𝜏=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖𝜏 +∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜌𝜏̅̅̅
𝑇
𝜏=1 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖0                                               (19) 
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For an industry with N firms, we have: 
∑ log𝑆𝑖𝑇 = ∑ ∑ ∑ [ I(𝐵𝜏 ≤ 𝐵0) ∙  𝜆
𝑡−𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜐𝑖𝜏
𝑡




















𝑖=1                (20) 
We can see that a possible result of bubble trades is that the relatively productive and big 
firms can relax their own borrowing constraints and get new investments through selling 
bubbles to investors. Meanwhile, the investors could get a higher expected return rate, 
compared with the return rate of the inefficient investments on small and new firms. 
Consequently, the overall expected output of the economy would grow.   
4.4.2 Bubble Collapse and Economic Recession 
A key problem for the bubble process is to identify the conditions under which the bubble 
would boom and bust. For bubbles derived from equation (11), the parameter 𝜃 governs the 
state of bubble’s boom and bust. The bubble would increase at a faster rate continuously when 
𝜃 takes the value one, otherwise the bubble would collapse. Since the industry growth rate is 
more commonly known by the investors and bubbles usually occur within an industry 
(Greenwood et al. 2019), it is reasonable to assume that bubbles are attractive to investors 
when the expected industry growth rate E(𝜌(𝑡+1)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) is higher than a certain level of return rate 
required by investors (𝜙),   
𝜃 = {
1, if E(𝜌(𝑡+1)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ≥ 𝜙
0, if E(𝜌(𝑡+1)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) < 𝜙
                                                       (21) 
At the beginning, bubbles occur randomly among the firms in an industry with an upper limit 
𝐵0. Once the industry growth rate reaches a certain value (𝜙), the bubbles with size above the 
upper limit 𝐵0 would enter the stage of booming, namely 𝜃 = 1. The bubble would collapse 
when the expected industry growth rate falls short of 𝜙, namely 𝜃 = 0.  
Then, we explore the possible impact on the industry growth during this dynamic process of 
bubble trades. One direct result would be that the capital would gradually flow into those 
industries with higher industry growth rate. At the beginning, bubbles with an upper limit 𝐵0 
are created randomly and sold by firms to investors. The bubbles give the firms a windfall and 
expand their production. This further improves the industry growth rate and facilitates the 
booming of bubbles. During the booming stage of bubbles, increasing money flows into the 
industry through bubble trades. Meanwhile, the expected output of the firms in the industry 
also experience a rapid increase. However, due to the uncertain components of 𝑡 and 𝜗𝑡, the 
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industry growth rate also has a risk to slow down. The investors would exit the bubble trades, 
once the industry growth rate falls short of their expectations 𝜙. The overall output of the 
industry during this process would also experience a sudden decline after the bubble’s 
collapse.   
So far, the bubble trades we described above would transfer relatively inefficient investment 
to the productive firms with higher expected growth rate. For the investors, they would expect 
to receive a higher expected return rate from these productive firms. In this case, the whole 
efficiency of the economy would increase. However, when the investment becomes highly 
concentrated in those relatively productive firms of an industry, the risk would concentrate on 
them, too. Once the bubbles collapse and investments ran away from this industry, the output 
would also slump in the short term. Worse still, due to that investments are already highly 
concentrated in these firms, the collapse of the bubbles would result in a huge loss to the 
whole economy and cause sequent decrease in output in the long term.  
4.4.3 Further Discussions 
Our model has shown that, during the initial stage of bubbles, the transfer of the investment 
from investors to the (productive) firms through bubble trading tends to improve the average 
investment efficiency and increase the average growth rate of output in an economy. 
Nevertheless, with the concentration of investments on an industry, the whole economy would 
be in a high risk of bubble collapse. This may further lead to a sudden reduction of the 
economic output. 
Another important implication of our model is that based on the equation (8), the firm sizes in 
an industry wound follow a highly right skewed distribution, namely the log normal 
distribution (Ijiri and Simon 1967). The number or frequency of bigger firms decreases with 
their size class. Simon et. al (1958; 1955) have proven that under the Gibrat’s law and 
meanwhile introducing some new-born firms at the minimum size 𝑆0, the final equilibrium of 
firm size distribution would be the Yule-Simon distribution. It is also a highly right skewed 
distribution. The decrease in the birth rate of new companies would lower the left tail and 
lengthen the right tail of Yule-Simon distribution.  
Therefore, when allowing new firms to generate at the minimum size 𝑆0, one possible result 
of bubble trading is that, the ‘birth rate’ of new firms whose size just transcend the minimum 
size 𝑆0  would decrease and few new companies arise in the economy. This is because 
investors’ money mostly flows into those productive firms above the minimum size and less 
Chapter 4 Economic Growth, Bubbles, and Firm Size Distribution  
113 
 
likely to do venture capital investment. This reduction of the new-born firms in the left tail of 
Yule-Simon distribution would further increase the risk concentration of the economy. In an 
extreme situation where no new firms are introduced into an industry, a log-normal 
distribution of firms will form (Simon 1955).  
It is noticeable that an underlying hypothesis of our analysis is that bubble’s evolvement is 
linked with the bubble buyer’s (investors) expectation on the industry growth rate of the 
bubble seller (firms). This hypothesis is consistent with recent studies that find positive 
correlations between fundamental economic factors and bubbles (Frankel 2014, Etienne et al. 
2015, Sockin and Xiong 2015b, Sanders and Irwin 2017, Lian et al. 2018). Although the 
bubbles reflect overpricing phenomenon in the economy, they are associated with 
fundamental factors to some extent. In this case, the bubble’s evolvement is correlated with 
the performance of corresponding firms in an industry, and bubbles in our model would show 
a periodically collapsing process. This is often the case in the real economy, compared with 
those models where bubbles are only allowed to occur from the beginning period and cannot 
collapse (Evans 1991).  
Moreover, the periodically collapsing bubbles and investment flows in our model indicate a 
possible mechanism of business cycles for the economy. The prosperity of the economy 
originates from investor’ rational expectations on the ongoing development of firms in an 
industry. They invest in the productive firms through bubble trades, in order to store value and 
obtain higher return in the future. Along with this process of investment concentration, the 
risk of the whole industry and economy also increases. Once the industry growth fails to meet 
the expected return rate required by investors, the economy would face up with a high risk of 
bubble collapses.  
In comparison with Martin and Ventura’s model (2012), we can see that a significant 
distinction is that our model uses the stochastic model of Yule-Simon distribution to replace 
the absolute productivity differentials and OLG framework in their analysis. We let the firms 
above the minimum size be the productive agents. This assumption is more realistic, based on 
the empirical studies on the distribution of firm sizes in the economy (Simon and Bonini 1958, 
Ijiri and Simon 1967, Stanley et al. 1995, 1996).2 More importantly, since we don’t assume a 
                                                 
2  The difference with previous studies that assuming competitive economy is that under the Gibrat’s law, the final 
equilibrium distribution of firm sizes is highly right skewed. This has been empirically verified by many studies (Simon 1955, 
Bain 1956, Simon and Bonini 1958, Ijiri and Simon 1967, Singh and Whittington 1975, Stanley et al. 1995, 1996, Axtell 
2001). In the contrast, based on the assumption of perfect competitive economy, distribution of firm sizes in an economy 
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two-period lived agents, our model allows the investors and firms to survive for infinite 
periods with a certain probability. Thereby, it would be much easier to implement the 
empirical test of the bubble’s effect on the economic development or business cycles, relative 
to the OLG framework with the two-period lived agents. In addition, we replace the investors’ 
sentiment shocks with their rational expectations on the industry growth, making the boom 
and bust of price bubbles depend on the investors’ rational expectations.  
At last, an expansion of our model is to introduce many industries’ (idiosyncratic) growth 
factors and an average growth rate for the economy. Based on Ijiri and Simon (1967), the firm 
growth rate can be decomposed into three components, 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∙ 𝜌𝑗𝑡 ∙ 𝜌?̅?, where 𝜌?̅? is the 
average growth rate of the economy, 𝜌𝑗𝑡 is the idiosyncratic growth factor attributable to the 
jth industry, and 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the idiosyncratic growth rate of firm i in the jth industry. Through this 
generalization of the model, we could further apply the model to the case of international 
economy and allow bubbles to trade among different countries. 
4.5 A Simulation of Bubbles 
To illustrate the impact of bubbles on the firm sizes or output in the economy, a simulation of 
the bubble and output growth is given in Figure 4.1 below. The growth path of firms and 
bubbles follows the equations as described above3. In the beginning, the economy is in the 
fundamental steady state and the bubble does not enter the stage of booming. In period 4, the 
bubble starts to boom, and the output of the economy measured by the firm sizes increases, 
too. The economy then enters a bubbly state. In period 8, shocks to the firms’ growth rate end 
this bubbly episode and the total output suffers a subsequent sharp reduction. In the following 
periods, the economy would experience a recession. This simulation clearly shows that 
introducing periodically collapsing bubbles into firm growth’s model is a promising strategy 
to explain the possible effects of bubbles on the economy during a dynamic process.  
                                                                                                                                                        
should be uniform; however, this is not the reality of the economy (Simon 2009). 




2 = 0.2, 𝜙 = 0.02,  𝐵0 = 1.2, 𝛿 = 0.8, 𝑟 = 0.  




Figure 4.1 Simulated Bubbles and Economy 
Source: Own calculations. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This paper proposes to use the stochastic model of the Yule-Simon distribution to describe the 
process of firm growth and productivity differentials in the economy. Compared with the 
model of bubbles based on the OLG framework, the assumptions for the stochastic model of 
Yule-Simon distribution are relatively weak and allow for a more general analysis of the 
bubbles and their effects on the economic output in terms of the calendar time. 
The assumption of financial frictions is another critical premise for the existence of bubbles in 
our model. Under the circumstances of productivity differentials and financial frictions, the 
economy with rational agents could experience periodically collapsing bubbles. As shown 
above, this could have complicated effects on the economic output.  
Our model provides a feasible framework for empirical studies on the bubble’s effect on 
economic output. For example, one possible application is that we can use our framework to 
analyse the real estate market in China. The over-prosperity of the real estate market in China 
has raised concerns about its negative effect on other industries and the economic 
development. The long lasting and increasing housing price has raised public worries that too 
much money has flown into the real estate industry, while the money ought to have flown into 
other industries. Although the real estate industry has contributed a lot to China’s economic 
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Simulated Bubbles and Economy
Total Firm Sizes Bubble B0





Abreu, D. and Brunnermeier, M. K., 2003. Bubbles and Crashes. Econometrica, 71 (1), 173–
204. 
Axtell, R. L., 2001. Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes. Science, 293 (5536), 1818–1820. 
Bain, J. S., 1956. Barriers to new competition: their charater and consequences in 
manufacturing industries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Binswanger, M., 1999. Stock Markets, Speculative Bubbles and Economic Growth [online]. 
Edward Elgar Publishing. Available from: 
https://ideas.repec.org/b/elg/eebook/1749.html [Accessed 14 Jan 2020]. 
Blanchard, O. J. and Watson, M. W., 1982. Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial 
Markets [online]. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper No. 945. 
Available from: http://www.nber.org/papers/w0945 [Accessed 21 Jan 2019]. 
Brunnermeier, M. K. and Oehmke, M., 2013. Chapter 18 - Bubbles, Financial Crises, and 
Systemic Risk. In: Constantinides, G. M., Harris, M., and Stulz, R. M., eds. Handbook 
of the Economics of Finance [online]. Elsevier, 1221–1288. Available from: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444594068000184 [Accessed 
15 Sep 2020]. 
Diamond, P. A., 1965. National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model. The American 
Economic Review, 55 (5), 1126–1150. 
Etienne, X. L., Irwin, S. H., and Garcia, P., 2015. Price Explosiveness, Speculation, and Grain 
Futures Prices. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 97 (1), 65–87. 
Evans, G. W., 1991. Pitfalls in Testing for Explosive Bubbles in Asset Prices. The American 
Economic Review, 81 (4), 922–930. 
Frankel, J. A., 2014. Effects of speculation and interest rates in a “carry trade” model of 
commodity prices. Journal of International Money and Finance, 42, 88–112. 
Gale, D., 1973. Pure exchange equilibrium of dynamic economic models. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 6 (1), 12–36. 
Greenwood, R., Shleifer, A., and You, Y., 2019. Bubbles for Fama. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 131 (1), 20–43. 
Gürkaynak, R. S., 2008. Econometric Tests of Asset Price Bubbles: Taking Stock*. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 22 (1), 166–186. 
Ijiri, Y. and Simon, H. A., 1967. A Model of Business Firm Growth. Econometrica, 35 (2), 
348–355. 
Jordà, Ò., Schularick, M., and Taylor, A. M., 2015. Leveraged bubbles. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 76, S1–S20. 
Chapter 4 Economic Growth, Bubbles, and Firm Size Distribution  
117 
 
Kamihigashi, T., 2006. Transversality Conditions and Dynamic Economic Behavior. In: . 
Kocherlakota, N., 2008. Injecting rational bubbles. Journal of Economic Theory, 142 (1), 
218–232. 
Kocherlakota, N. R., 2009. Bursting Bubbles: Consequences and Cures. Unpublished 
manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 39. 
Lian, C., Ma, Y., and Wang, C., 2018. Low Interest Rates and Risk Taking: Evidence from 
Individual Investment Decisions [online]. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network. SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 2809191. Available from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2809191 [Accessed 24 May 2019]. 
Martin, A. and Ventura, J., 2012. Economic Growth with Bubbles. American Economic 
Review, 102 (6), 3033–3058. 
Martin, A. and Ventura, J., 2018. The Macroeconomics of Rational Bubbles: A User’s Guide. 
Annual Review of Economics, 10 (1), 505–539. 
Miao, J., 2014. Introduction to economic theory of bubbles. Journal of Mathematical 
Economics, 53, 130–136. 
Miao, J. and Wang, P., 2012. Bubbles and Total Factor Productivity. American Economic 
Review, 102 (3), 82–87. 
Miao, J. and Wang, P., 2018. Asset Bubbles and Credit Constraints. American Economic 
Review, 108 (9), 2590–2628. 
Miao, J., Wang, P., and Zhou, J., 2015. Asset bubbles, collateral, and policy analysis. Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 76, S57–S70. 
Olivier, J., 2000. Growth-Enhancing Bubbles. International Economic Review, 41 (1), 133–
152. 
Samuelson, P. A., 1958. An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the 
Social Contrivance of Money. Journal of Political Economy, 66 (6), 467–482. 
Sanders, D. R. and Irwin, S. H., 2017. Bubbles, Froth and Facts: Another Look at the Masters 
Hypothesis in Commodity Futures Markets. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68 (2), 
345–365. 
Santos, M. S. and Woodford, M., 1997. Rational Asset Pricing Bubbles. Econometrica, 65 (1), 
19–57. 
Simon, H. A., 1955. On a Class of Skew Distribution Functions. Biometrika, 42 (3/4), 425–
440. 
Simon, H. A., 2009. An Emprically Based Microeconomics. Cambridge University Press. 
Simon, H. A. and Bonini, C. P., 1958. The Size Distribution of Business Firms. The American 
Economic Review, 48 (4), 607–617. 
Chapter 4 Economic Growth, Bubbles, and Firm Size Distribution  
118 
 
Singh, A. and Whittington, G., 1975. The Size and Growth of Firms. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 42 (1), 15–26. 
Sockin, M. and Xiong, W., 2015. Informational Frictions and Commodity Markets. The 
Journal of Finance, 70 (5), 2063–2098. 
Stanley, M. H. R., Amaral, L. A. N., Buldyrev, S. V., Havlin, S., Leschhorn, H., Maass, P., 
Salinger, M. A., and Stanley, H. E., 1996. Scaling behaviour in the growth of 
companies. Nature, 379 (6568), 804. 
Stanley, M. H. R., Buldyrev, S. V., Havlin, S., Mantegna, R. N., Salinger, M. A., and Eugene 
Stanley, H., 1995. Zipf plots and the size distribution of firms. Economics Letters, 49 
(4), 453–457. 
Stiglitz, J. E., 1990. Symposium on Bubbles. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (2), 13–18. 
Tirole, J., 1982. On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations. Econometrica, 
50 (5), 1163–1181. 
Tirole, J., 1985. Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations. Econometrica, 53 (6), 1499. 
 
 





Chapter 5  Price Discovery and Volatility Spillovers in Chinese 







Qianqian MAO1, Jens-Peter LOY1, Yanjun REN2  
 
1 Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Kiel, Germany. 
2 Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), 06120 





This paper has been submitted to Finance Research Letters 
  




The Red Fuji apple futures contracts introduced in China at the end of 2017 marked the first 
fresh fruit trade at a futures exchange. This paper models the relationship between the futures 
and spot prices for apples. Evidence based on daily price data reveals that apple futures 
contracts function poorly in terms of price discovery and spot prices show no improvements 
in synchronisation among major apple spot markets. The volatility analyses from GARCH 
and BEKK-MGARCH models indicate that futures markets do not lead to higher spot price 
volatility and even reduce the spot price volatility in the short term. The findings of this study 
question the efficiency of the Red Fuji apple futures market. In order to facilitate the 
exchange of information between the futures and spot markets, regulators should consider 
measures to attract more commercial traders into the futures market. 
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Agricultural commodity futures markets have become increasingly important for price 
discovery, hedging and risk transfer (Hernandez & Torero, 2010; Yang et al., 2001). At the 
end of 2017, the trade of fresh Red Fuji apple futures contracts started at the Zhengzhou 
Commodity Exchange (ZCE) in China. In this paper we analyse the main function of the new 
futures market, which is the first futures market for fresh fruits worldwide. 
The law of one price and no-arbitrage opportunities suggests a long-run equilibrium price for 
the futures and spot markets of one commodity (Listorti & Esposti, 2012). Every trader can 
hedge against or speculate on the price provided by the apple futures market if the futures 
price is an unbiased predictor for spot price at the time of maturity. To test this connection, a 
linear co-integration relationship has to be observed between apple futures and spot prices at 
the time of maturity (Brenner & Kroner, 1995). Meanwhile, in a market where no one has all 
the information on supply and demand, auction theory implies that a trader would adjust his 
or her price expectation based on others’ quotations (Milgrom, 2017). Thus, the basis between 
the futures price and each regional market’s spot price may motivate local traders to access 
new information and adjust their price expectations accordingly. This would improve the 
synchronisation level of spot price changes among different regions if nationwide apple 
traders became actively involved in the futures trade and shared their private information 
through futures markets.  
Moreover, traders’ disagreements on the same market information and their heterogeneous 
priors could result in high price volatility (Hong & Stein, 2007; Gizatulina & Hellman, 2019). 
The futures market is expected to reduce spot price volatility because it could speed up the 
homogenisation of traders’ common expectations (Porter & Smith, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
public tends to believe that the apple futures market has led to higher volatility because it 
attracts too many speculators into the market who distort price formation. 
Following the discussion above, the primary function of the apple futures market is to 
facilitate information exchange and price formation. This study investigates three different 
aspects of the operation of this new futures market for fresh fruit. (1) We check whether 
futures prices can predict spot prices at the time of maturity. The futures price is expected to 
provide an unbiased predictor for the spot price, so this is a precondition of the futures market. 
(2) We check whether the operation of the futures market improves the synchronisation level 
of price changes among major apple spot markets. If nationwide commercial traders obtain 
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more information through futures trade, the timing of individual spot price changes across 
different markets tends to synchronise. (3) Finally, we test whether the apple futures market 
increases its spot price volatility. A detailed empirical analysis of the effects of the apple 
futures market is important not only for the market under study but also for establishing 
futures market contracts for other fresh fruits. 
In the following analysis, we first describe the data source of apple futures and spot prices in 
Section 5.2. Then, in Section 5.3, we implement the co-integration tests to analyse the long 
run equilibrium relationship between apple futures and spot prices. Moreover, we test the 
synchronisation degree of price changes among major apple markets before and after the 
introduction of the apple futures market. At last, the change of spot price volatility and the 
volatility spillovers effects are investigated. Section 5.5 summarises the paper and gives our 
conclusions. 
5.2 Data and Methodology 
Being the largest producer, consumer, and exporter of apples worldwide, China produced 57% 
of the global apple harvest (43.88 million tons) in 2016 (ZCE, 2018). The main apple species 
in China is the Red Fuji, with a harvest of more than 70% of the country’s total apple 
production. Therefore, it is reasonable that China established a futures market for Red Fuji 
apples. After the harvest season, which occurs around October, some of the apples will enter 
the market for consumption and the rest will be stored in cooling warehouses for consumption 
over the year. Correspondingly, the futures contract offers seven delivery months, namely 
January, March, May, July, October, November, and December. The trading unit of an apple 
futures contract is 10 metric tons/lot, which is physically delivered. The quality of apple 
should meet the Chinese national standard ‘GB/T 10651-2008’: fresh apples with fruit width 
greater than or equal to 80mm, a fruit width tolerance no greater than 5% and quality 
tolerance no greater than 10% (ZCE, 2018). 
For the futures price of apples, we use the nearby futures contract price obtained from ZCE, 
which covers the period from 22nd December, 2017 to 12th December, 2019. The daily open 
interest data from ZCE serves as an indicator of speculative activity. For the spot price, since 
the futures price aggregates the information from traders nationwide, we use the Qianhai 
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wholesale price index (QW index) for Red Fuji apples1. China’s Ministry of Commerce uses 
this index as an official price indicator for Red Fuji apples because it captures the trend of 
apple prices in major markets nationwide. The sample period of the QW index is from 1st 
January, 2016 to 12th December, 2019; both the periods before and after the introduction of 
futures markets are around two years. We also use the individual price components contained 
in the QW index to calculate the degree of synchronisation of the price changes across major 
apple markets. These individual price series, representing thirty-five large wholesale markets 
across eighteen Chinese provinces, keep constant for some periods and often change by 
discrete amounts. We take the logarithms of all price series under study. 
We first conduct a co-integration analysis by applying Johansen’s test, then gauge the 
synchronisation level of spot price changes. Specifically, we compare the standard deviation 
of the actual proportion of price changes in each period with the standard deviations of perfect 
synchronisation and/or staggering (Loy & Weiss, 2002). If prices are perfectly staggered, the 
proportion of price changes in any period would be equal to the average proportion of price 
changes over time and the standard deviation should be close to zero. If prices were perfectly 
synchronized, the proportion of price series in any period would be either 0 or 1 and the 
standard deviation should be close to 0.5. We then compare the synchronisation levels before 
and after the establishment of the apple futures market. 
We further estimate volatility spillovers between apple futures and spot market prices. Engle 
and Kroner (1995) present a detailed introduction about GARCH and BEKK-MGARCH 
model, so we use the GARCH model with additional exogeneous variables to gauge whether 
there is a structural break of price volatilities after introducing the futures market. Finally, we 
use the BEKK-MGARCH model to analyse spillovers across futures and spot markets. 
5.3 Estimation results 
5.3.1 Co-integration Analysis 
The difference of the log prices is stationary, though the log price series shows non-stationary 
results (See Table 5.1). The QW index has a common trend with futures prices, but there is no 
tight correlation between them (see Figure 5.1). After an initial period that features price 
divergence, the futures and spot prices tend to have a common process; however, around 1st 
July, 2019, these two prices deviate from each other again. The futures price jumped down on 
                                                 
1 Another prosaic reason for the usage of the QW index is that it is the only time-variant price series available to 
us. Other price series all present discrete changing behaviour, which is not suitable for volatility analysis. 
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1st July, 2019, while the spot price continued to increase. This price divergence reflects that 
the apple contracts from July to October correspond to different harvests and the inventory 
was running out during this period. The July contract corresponds to apples harvested in 2018 
and the October contract corresponds to apples harvested in 2019. The harvest reduction 
caused by poor weather in 2018 resulted in an inventory shortage between July and October 
2019. With this low inventory, arbitrage may not work effectively and there is no other force 
that links futures and spot prices together (Yang et al., 2001). Once inventories run out, no 
stocks can be released into the market to dampen the soaring price. Analysing the Johansen 
test in Table 5.1, no co-integration relationship is found between apple futures and spot prices, 
suggesting that futures prices have no long-run adjustments on spot prices and cannot be 
considered as unbiased predictors for spot price.2 Thus, the futures market functions poorly in 
discovering spot prices. 
Table 5.1 ADF and Johansen tests 
  Futures Price: Spot Price (QW): 
ADF Test -1.68 -1.54 
P-value 0.44 0.52 
 
Futures Price Returns: Spot Price Returns (QW): 
ADF Test -21.21 -38.73 
P-value 0.00 0.00 
Johansen test: 𝑅0 𝑅1 
 23.60 4.65 
 (15.41) (3.76) 
Source: personal calculations with Stata 15. 
  
                                                 
2 We further use separate co-integration tests before and after 1st July, ,2019 and find no cointegrated relationship 
between apple futures and spot prices. 




Figure 5.1 Futures price and QW index 
Source: personal calculations based on data from ZCE and China’s Ministry of Commerce using Stata 15. 
5.3.2 The Synchronisation Level of Price Changes 
One of the main purposes for establishing apple futures market is to provide a unified 
platform for traders from different regions. However, if the fresh apple market is segmented 
into many regional markets, price changes tend to be staggering among different regions. This 
is due to that each local market has its own specific conditions and prevents the spatial 
arbitrage. The synchronisation degree of price changes should increase if the apple futures 
market has functioned well as the role of price discovery and gathering information for all 
traders from different regions.  
We use the individual wholesale price series from QW index. They are collected from 35 
important wholesale markets for apples around China. We then estimate the synchronisation 
level of price changes among different regions. Results in Table 5.2 show that the actual 
standard deviations before and after the introduction of futures markets are much closer to 
that obtained under the assumption of price staggering. The standard deviation even decreases 
from 0.06 to 0.05 after the introduction of apple futures markets. The futures market hasn’t 
significantly improved the synchronisation level of apple price changes nationwide, further 
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suggesting that more commercial traders need to be involved in the futures market. 
Segmented markets of apple trades remain even after the introduction of futures market. 
Table 5.2 Comparing the mean and standard deviations of different cases 









Assuming perfect staggering a 0.04 0.04 
Assuming perfect synchronisation 0.34 0.32 
Difference from perfect staggering b 6.67% 3.57% 
Observations 709 688 
a The standard deviations are calculated from the actual number of price changes. 
b Calculated as (𝜎𝑠𝑡 − 𝜎𝑑) (𝜎𝑠𝑡 − 𝜎𝑠𝑦) ∗ 100%⁄ , where 𝜎𝑑, 𝜎𝑠𝑡 and 𝜎𝑠𝑦 are the standard deviations in the data, the standard 
deviation under the assumption of perfect staggering, and the standard deviation under the assumption of perfect 
synchronisation, respectively. 
Source: personal calculations with Stata 15. 
So far, we have found limited effects of the fresh apple futures market on its spot market. 
Neither can it act as an unbiased price predictor, nor improve the synchronisation level of 
price changes among major apple markets. One possible reason is that not enough commercial 
traders have participated in the futures trade or hedged their risks through futures trade. This 
may result in the disconnection between the apple futures and spot prices. Another possible 
reason is the difference between commodity cash and futures markets in the ability of 
incorporating relevant price information (Crain and Lee 1996, Yang and Leatham 1999). The 
commodity spot market is for immediate delivery, traders in which may not have time to 
respond to new information. The results of price synchronisation further prove that different 
spot markets fail to respond to the information simultaneously. Some of them react to the 
information shocks and some not, exhibiting a sluggish movement for price changes.  
5.3.3 Price Volatility Spillovers Effect 
The spot price volatility changes before and after the introduction of the apple futures market 
is investigated using the GARCH model with exogeneous variable. Afterwards, the volatility 
spillovers across the apple futures and spot prices is analysed through a BEKK-MGARCH 
model.  
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The estimated results of GARCH-model with exogeneous variables are shown in the second 
and third columns of Table 5.3. The significant Arch and GARCH-coefficients in both 
specifications suggest a volatility cluster effect for the spot price series. In the second column, 
we use a dummy variable, ‘Futures’, to indicate the period when the apple futures market has 
been operating. The coefficient value of the dummy variable is 1.04 and highly significant 
because it means the apple spot price has become more volatile since the introduction of the 
futures market. However, this cannot directly prove that it is the futures market that caused 
the more volatile spot price. In the third column of Table 5.3, we use the daily open interest to 
represent the impact of speculation from the futures market and find significant negative 
effects from the open interest on the spot price volatility.  
Table 5.3 GARCH model with dummy variable or open interest 
  Apple Spot Price (01Jul2016 – 12Dec2019) 

















Open Interest -- -0.17*** 
(0.05) 












obs 967 967 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Source: personal calculations with Stata 15. 
We proceed to analyse the volatility spillovers between these two markets through the BEKK-
MGARCH model. The results are listed in Table 5.4.3  The coefficient 𝑎𝑖𝑗 measures the direct 
effect of lagged innovations originating in market i on the conditional return volatility in 
market j in the current period, whereas the 𝑏𝑖𝑗  captures the direct dependence of the 
conditional volatility in market j on that of market i. When only considering these direct cross 
effects, the innovations in the futures market tend to have a negative effect on the conditional 
                                                 
3 Treating the price jump-down as missing in July 1st, 2019 has virtually no impact on the estimation results of 
BEKK-MGARCH model. 
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volatility in the spot market (𝑎21 = −0.15), while the volatility dependence of the spot 
market on the futures market reveals a limited positive effect (𝑏21 = 0.07). 
Table 5.4 The results of BEKK-Mgarch Model 
  Apple (01jul2018 – 01jul2019) 





𝑐𝑖2*100 —— 0.83*** 
(0.16) 
















Log likelihood function:  2388.94   
Obs. 479 479 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Source: personal calculations with Stata 15. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the operation of the newly established fresh Red Fuji apple futures 
market. Futures markets are supposed to facilitate information exchange and price formation. 
Based on the law of one price and no-arbitrage conditions, the efficiency of the futures market 
suggests a long-run equilibrium price for futures and spot markets; however, through various 
tests, we find limited effects from the apple futures market on its spot market. The futures 
price can neither act as an unbiased price predictor nor does it improve the synchronisation 
level of price changes among major apple spot markets. The inventory shortages and limited 
information exchange across the futures and spot markets may result in a disconnection 
between apple futures and spot prices. Commercial traders may not have fully participated in 
the futures market or revealed their own information on supply and demand through futures 
trading. The fresh apple market is more likely to be locally oriented than nationally. We find 
that the apple futures price tends to alleviate its spot price volatility in the short term, which 
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illustrates that the futures market accelerates the homogenisation of traders’ common 
expectations to some extent. Our study suggests that the regulators should take measures to 
attract more commercial traders from different regions in China into the futures market in 
order to improve the efficiency of the new fresh Red Fuji apple futures market.     
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Chapter 6  Further Introductions of the Methods and Theories 
 
In this chapter, we make a detailed introduction on the theories and methods which are used 
but are not fully explained in previous chapters.  
6.1 Rational Bubbles under the OLG Framework  
We use the theoretical model of bubbles proposed by Martin and Ventura (2012) as an 
example. The core idea of their model is that under the assumption of rationality and financial 
frictions, productive investors would sell bubbles to the unproductive investors. This trade 
transfers the money from the unproductive agents to the productive agents and raises the 
average productivity of the whole economy. In this case, the inefficient investment chain will 
be replaced by a more efficient investment chain, which thus enhance the overall output of the 
economy.  
They base their analysis on the OLG model and consider a production economy. In the model, 
each agent only survives two periods: the youth and the old. For the young agents, they can 
use their human capital to produce and earn wages. Part of the wages will be consumed during 
their young period, and the rest will be saved or invested for future consumption. For the old 
agents, they can only consume what they obtain from their savings or investment income 
during their youth. 
Specifically, the production economy in their model is consisted of an OLG model and a 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 𝐹(𝑙𝑡, 𝑘𝑡) = 𝑙𝑡
1−𝛼 ∙ 𝑘𝑡
𝛼 with α ∈ (0,1), where 𝑙𝑡 and 𝑘𝑡 are 
the labor force and capital stock, respectively. Assuming that only young agents have one unit 
of labor (𝑙𝑡 = 1) in the economy, markets are competitive, and factors of production are paid 
the value of their marginal product,  
               𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑘𝑡
𝛼   and    𝑟𝑡 = α ∙ 𝑘𝑡
𝛼−1                                              (1)   
where 𝑤𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡 are the wage and the rental rate, respectively. 
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The stock of capital in period 𝑡 + 1 depends on the investment made by young generation t 
during its youth. Martin and Ventura (2012) assume that some individuals are better at 
investing than others, whose fraction of the whole investors is  ∈[0, 1]. They can produce 
one unit of output with one unit of capital (productive investors), while the rest can only 
produce 𝛿<1 units of output (unproductive investors). Assuming that the young use all their 
savings to invest, and the savings consist of their labor income, whose fraction is 𝑠≡1−𝛼 of 
output. If financial markets worked well, productive investors would borrow money from the 
unproductive ones and pay them reasonable returns. A key assumption of Martin and 
Ventura’s model is the financial frictions, which prevent this effective borrowing behavior 
and the unproductive investors have to make their own investments. Thus, the average 
investment efficiency is determined by the population weights of both types of investors and 
equals: 𝐴≡ +(1− ) ∙𝛿. Under these assumptions, the dynamics of the capital stock of the 
economy are given by 
                             𝑘𝑡+1 = A ∙ s ∙ 𝑘𝑡
𝛼                                                                  (2) 
namely, 𝑠 ≡ 1 − 𝛼 of output at time t is used to produce the new capital with efficiency of 
𝐴 ≡ + (1 − ) ∙ 𝛿. 
Martin and Ventura (2012) then pick a non-negative stochastic process for the bubbles and the 
bubbles have three forms: (i) 𝑏𝑡  is the market price of the portfolio that contains all old 
bubbles, i.e. already existing before period t or created by earlier generations; (ii) 𝑏𝑡
𝑃 is the 
market price of the portfolios that contains all new bubbles created by productive investors at 
time t; (iii) 𝑏𝑡
𝑈 is the market price of the portfolios that contains all new bubbles created by 







Under the setup described above, bubbles can be traded between different investors and result 










 = 𝛿 ∙ 𝛼 ∙ 𝑘𝑡+1





∈ [𝛿 ∙ 𝛼 ∙ 𝑘𝑡+1
𝛼−1, 𝛼 ∙ 𝑘𝑡+1





= 𝛼 ∙ 𝑘𝑡+1





                              (3) 
                            
0 ≤ 𝑏𝑡 ≤ 𝑠 ∙ 𝑘𝑡
𝛼                                                                 (4) 
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where the left hand of equation (3) is the growth (return) rate of bubbles at t+1 and the right 
hand is the rental rate of capital for unproductive investors and productive investors. 
Specifically, (1 − ) ∙ 𝑠 ∙ 𝑘𝑡
𝛼  is the savings of unproductive investors at time t.  𝛿 ∙ 𝛼 ∙ 𝑘𝑡+1
𝛼−1 is 
the rental rate of unproductive investors’ savings at time t+1. When the bubble is small, the 
marginal buyer is an unproductive investors and the capital accumulation equals the savings 




the savings of the unproductive investors minus the value of the bubbles they purchase times 
their efficiency (the value is δ), i.e., 𝛿 ∙ [(1 − ) ∙ 𝑠 ∙ 𝑘𝑡
𝛼 + 𝑏𝑡
𝑈 − 𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡
𝑃 − 𝑏𝑡
𝑈] . When the 
bubble becomes large, the marginal buyer is a productive investor. Unproductive investors do 
not build capital and capital accumulation equals the savings of the productive ones, i.e., ∙ 𝑠 ∙
𝑘𝑡
𝛼 + 𝑏𝑡
𝑃  ; minus the bubbles they purchase, i.e., [𝑏𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡
𝑃 + 𝑏𝑡
𝑈 − (1 − ) ∙ 𝑠 ∙ 𝑘𝑡
𝛼 − 𝑏𝑡
𝑈] . 
More importantly, the dynamics of the capital stock in this case would be:  
𝑘𝑡+1 = {
𝐴 ∙ 𝑠 ∙ 𝑘𝑡
𝛼 + (1 − 𝛿) ∙ 𝑏𝑡











                      (5) 
Two possible outcomes of bubbles can be seen from equation (5). The first one is the classic 
crowding-out effect: when the old people sell bubbles to the young, consumption grows and 
investment falls. This is why 𝑏𝑡 slows down capital accumulation. It is worthy of attention 
that the unproductive investments are crowded out first. It is only when there are no 
unproductive investments, the bubble would start to crowd out productive investments. 
During this process, the average investment efficiency would improve. The second 
macroeconomic effect of bubbles is a new reallocation effect. The unproductive investments 
can be replaced by productive investments through bubbles’ trading between different 
investors. This further explain that why 𝑏𝑡
𝑃  speeds up capital accumulation. The relative 
magnitudes of these two effects determine the final effect of bubbles on the economy. 
Furthermore, Martin and Ventura (2012) contend that the ratio of bubbles over savings at each 
period should lay in the interval [0,1]. They deduce that the bubble occurrences are possible if 
and only if,   












}        𝑖𝑓 𝐴 > 1 −
                             (6) 
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So far, we can see that the advantage of Martin and Ventura’s model is that it can explain the 
changes of output, consumption, and capital stock in the economy. The inefficient self-
investment of unproductive investors is replaced by the efficient investment of productive 
investors, so that the overall efficiency of the economy will improve through bubble trades. 
However, they still limit their model to the OLG framework, where agents could only survive 
for two periods. Moreover, in their simulated result of bubbles, the origin of bubbles is 
determined by the investors’ sentiment shock. This tends to be contradictory with their 
assumption of ration agents. 
6.2 Univariate GARCH Model 
We first introduce the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model (ARCH) proposed 
by Engle (1982). Let 𝑡 be the innovations in a linear regression,  
𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡
′𝑏                                                              (7) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝑥𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables, and b is a vector of 
unknown parameters. Let 𝜓𝑡 be the information set (Sigma field) of all information through 
time t. The linear univariate ARCH model can be written as  
𝑡|𝜓𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡)                                                          (8) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑡−1
2 +⋯+ 𝛼𝑝 𝑡−𝑝
2                                              (9) 
This model is called ARCH of order p, or ARCH(p). 
Bollerslev (1986) further generalized the ARCH model by allowing past conditional variances 
to appear in the current conditional variance equation, namely the general autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity model (GARCH). The GARCH (p, q) process is given by 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 𝑡−𝑖
2𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗ℎ𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1                                    (10) 
where 𝑝 ≥ 0, 𝑞 > 0, 𝛼0 > 0, 𝛼𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑝, 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞. Moreover, exogeneous 
variables could also be incorporated into the conditional variance equation of GARCH (p, q) 
process. 
6.3 BEKK Multivariate GARCH Model 
The BEKK Multivariate GARCH model (BEKK MGARCH) is proposed by Engle and 
Kroner (1995), which is used to estimate the volatility spillovers among different price series. 
The extension from a univariate GARCH model to an n-variate model requires allowing the 
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conditional variance-covariance matrix of the n-dimensional zero mean random variables to 
depend on elements of the information set Ψ𝑡. Letting 𝐻𝑡 be measurable with respect to Ψ𝑡−1, 
the BEKK MGARCH model can be written as  
𝜺𝑡|Ψ𝑡−1~𝑁(0,𝐻𝑡)                                                        (11) 





𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝐺𝑖
′𝐻𝑡−𝑖𝐺𝑖
𝑞
𝑗=1                                (12) 
where C, 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐺𝑖 are 𝑛 × 𝑛 parameter matrices.  


























]                                                        (13) 
The coefficient 𝑎𝑖𝑗 measures the direct effect of lagged innovations originating in market i on 
the conditional return volatility in market j in the current period, whereas the 𝑔𝑖𝑗 captures the 
direct dependence of the conditional volatility in market j on that of market i.  
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Chapter 7  Conclusions 
 
The abnormal agricultural price movement and its impact on the livelihood of the poor have 
gained considerable public attention and research interests, since the food crisis around 
2007/08. As the most populous country, China would suffer welfare losses during the volatile 
food price period. To avoid the shock on the people’s livelihood, China has implemented 
many measures to stabilize its agricultural commodity markets. However, the mechanism 
behind the agricultural price bubbles is still under discussion among scholars and no 
consensus is achieved in this field. 
In order to enhance our understanding of the fundamental mechanism behind the agricultural 
price bubbles, this dissertation consisting of four contributions examines the origins of 
agricultural price bubbles and their possible effects in China, and further constructs a 
theoretical model to explain business cycles with price bubbles. These studies not only 
provide the empirical evidence for agricultural price bubbles, but also contribute to economic 
implications and recommendations for farmers, commodity traders, commodity exchange 
regulators and policy makers. Since each chapter focuses on a specific research issue 
regarding agricultural price bubbles, a comprehensive review is drawn in this chapter and 
each contribution is summarized separately as following. 
Price Bubbles in Agricultural Commodity Markets and Contributing Factors: 
Evidence for Corn and Soybeans in China 
Through a recently developed rolling window right-side augmented Dickey-Fuller (GSADF) 
test by Phillips et al.  (2012, 2015), this study first detects the exact dates of price bubbles in 
China’s two highly traded agricultural commodity markets, namely corn and soybeans. Then, 
we continue to use a penalized maximum likelihood estimation of a multinomial logistic 
model to estimate the contributing factors of price bubbles in each commodity futures market.  
The results of bubble detection illustrate that bubbles only occur in a very low proportion of 
our sample period (2006-2017), namely 5.48% for corn and 3.91% for soybeans. Negative 
Chapter 7 Conclusions 
139 
 
bubbles are most frequently observed in the corn market, while positive bubbles are more 
prominent in the soybeans market. The magnitudes of the price changes during these bubble 
periods are generally small and price bubbles usually do not coincide with price peaks or 
troughs. This is counterintuitive and bubbles often occur when prices suddenly increase or 
crash. 
The different dates and types of bubbles in the corn and soybeans futures markets suggest a 
separate investigation of the potential factors contributing to price bubbles for each 
commodity. The results of the multinomial logistic model show that higher market liquidity 
and speculation reduce the likelihood of positive bubbles for corn, while they increase the 
likelihood of positive bubbles for soybeans. This supports the idea that these two markets 
have different characteristics and may thus react differently to speculative attacks. The main 
difference between Chinese corn and soybeans markets is the self-sufficiency rate of domestic 
production/consumption. Chinese corn has a high self-sufficiency rate of over 95%, while 
soybean is the largest imported agricultural commodity with the self-sufficiency rate less than 
25% (Li, et al., 2017). The commodities with higher self-sufficiency rate have shown less 
volatile price movements in China, such as corn, rice and wheat (Li, et al., 2017; Yang et al., 
2008). In the contrary, Chinese soybeans market is often confronted with a tight balance of 
supply/demand and may thus become more sensitive to price fluctuations. This is consistent 
with our findings that Chinese soybeans market is more vulnerable to speculative attacks, 
while corn market is more stable under higher market liquidity and speculation. 
For the fundamental economic factors, domestic and world stocks-to-use, and external bubble 
shocks (from corresponding USA futures markets) exhibit different effects on these two 
commodity markets. Again, we find that Chinese corn market is relatively stable, while the 
soybeans price bubbles are more likely to be affected by its domestic and world stocks-to-use, 
and external bubble shocks. This may reflect the different levels of market openness for corn 
and soybeans. Unlike the corn market, Chinese soybeans market is highly connected with the 
international markets and imports more than half of its soybeans for domestic consumption. 
Moreover, higher exchange rate tends to reduce both types of bubbles for corn, while it 
increases the negative bubbles for soybeans. The weather shocks (SOI) and gasoline price are 
found to only affect the bubble occurrences in the corn market. The probability of positive 
(negative) bubbles increases when the weather condition is bad (good) for the growth of corn. 
Higher gasoline prices are associated with more (less) positive (negative) bubbles. This is 
consistent with previous studies that find increasing demand of corn for producing biofuels 
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leads to a higher corn price (Wu et al. 2011, Adämmer and Bohl 2015). Finally, positive 
bubbles for both corn and soybeans are more likely to occur in the presence of strong 
economic activity, high interest rates and low inflation level. 
In conclusion, we find complicated effects of specific factors that contribute to agricultural 
price bubbles. Unlike previous studies, we find crucial differences for bubbles of different 
commodities. This further suggests that policy makers should adopt commodity-specific 
measures to curb bubble occurrences in different commodity markets.  
Agricultural Price Transmission between Futures and Spot Markets during Price 
Bubbles 
In this chapter, we first examine the degree of bubble synchronisation between agricultural 
commodity futures and spot markets in China, using the weekly price data for corn and 
soybeans over the period 2009-2017. Afterwards, using the Markov Switching Error 
Correction Model (MSECM) and the Dynamic Conditional Correlation GARCH Model 
(DCC-MGARCH), we investigate the dynamic interdependence between futures and spot 
prices in terms of their first moments and second moments. Particularly, we concentrate on 
the price interdependence during the price bubble episodes. 
The results indicate that the bubble occurrences tend to be staggered between agricultural 
commodity futures and spot markets. This does not support the deduction from the hypothesis 
that the speculation in futures markets mainly contributes to price bubbles. Moreover, it is 
noticeable that we find only a few bubbles for futures prices, regardless of the commodity 
species, even though there is a co-integration relationship between agricultural futures and 
spot prices. This raises our suspect about the effectiveness of commodity spot markets and 
there may be a nonlinear transmission effect between agricultural futures and spot prices. 
We continue to use the MSECM and DCC-MGARCH methods to estimate the nonlinear 
transmission effect. The results of MSECM support that the co-integration relationship 
becomes weak and the adjustment effect of spot prices toward the long-run equilibrium is the 
lowest during the regime where bubble occurs the most frequently. The spot price returns are 
more likely to be affected by its own lagged terms. This suggest that the commodity spot 
markets may fail to respond to the new market information as effectively as futures markets. 
Meanwhile, we find a loose dynamic volatility interdependence between futures and spot 
prices. The lack of sensitivity to new market information may have resulted in more bubbles 
episodes of spot prices. 




Economic Growth, Bubbles, and Firm Size Distribution 
Under the assumptions of productivity differentials and financial frictions, the economy with 
rational agents could experience periodically collapsing bubbles and business cycles (Santos 
and Woodford 1997, Martin and Ventura 2012). When the financial market is inefficient, 
bubbles could act as a tool for capital reallocation. Nevertheless, the instability of bubbles 
could result in huge economic losses.  
This study constructs a new theoretical framework for the economy with periodically 
collapsing bubbles. It attempts to incorporate rational bubbles into the stochastic model of 
firm growth behind the Yule-Simon distribution. The Yule-Simon distribution has been used 
to describe the distribution of firms in the economy and could be deduced from certain 
assumptions on the process of firm growth (Ijiri and Simon 1967, Simon and Bonini 1958, 
Simon 1955). Compared with previous models of bubbles embedded in the Overlapping 
Generations (OLG) framework, our model does not impose finite lived periods for agents and 
allows for infinitely lived agents. This enables a better interpretation and empirical 
examination on bubble’s effect on the economy in terms of the calendar time. Moreover, our 
model can be easily generalized into a model for many industries or many countries. 
Our model shows that bubbles could enhance the economic growth through transferring the 
money from the unproductive agents to the productive ones. As a result, the output, capital 
cumulation, and social welfare improve, as well. However, once there is a negative shock on 
the productivity of firms, the industry growth would fail to meet investors’ expected return 
rate and the economy faces a high risk of bubble collapses and recession.  
For policy implications, our model supports that the government should take measures to 
prevent hot money from overly flowing into the industries with high expected returns. 
Otherwise, the industry would absorb too much money and the whole economy would be in a 
danger of collapse.  
 
Price discovery and volatility spillovers in Chinese apple futures market 
The global first fresh fruit futures market for apple (Red Fuji) was established in the end of 
2017 in China. This paper examines the effects of apple futures market on its spot prices from 
Chapter 7 Conclusions 
142 
 
different perspectives. Based on daily price data from Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange 
(ZCE), we analyse the price discovery, synchronisation, and volatility spillover effects.  
Through the co-integration analysis, we find no long run equilibrium relationship between 
apple futures and spot prices. This reveals that apple futures market has a limited function for 
price discovery and cannot be considered as an unbiased predictor for its spot price. The 
failure of price discovery further undermines the hedging effectiveness of apple futures 
market for commercial traders.  
Furthermore, we adopt the method that gauge the synchronisation degree of price changes 
among different price series. We compare the standard deviations of the actual proportion of 
price changes in each period with the standard deviations of perfect synchronisation and/or 
staggering (Fisher and Konieczny, 2000; Loy and Weiss, 2002). The result indicates that the 
operation of apple futures market does not improve the price synchronisation among major 
apple markets in China.  
At last, we implement the volatility analyses through GARCH and BEKK-MGARCH models. 
The result of univariate GARCH model indicates that the apple spot price volatility has 
increased a lot in the last two years, but we find that the increase of spot price volatility 
cannot be attributable to the speculation in the apple futures market. The result of BEKK-
MGARCH even shows that futures price tends to reduce the spot price volatility in the short 
term.  
Our study reveals that apple futures market does not serve well for the price discovery and 
may reduce the spot price volatility to some extent. This causes a doubt about whether fresh 
fruit is suitable for futures trading. So far, the regulators of ZCE have taken measures to 
restrict the positions of speculators. Our results show that these measures may not be useful 
for a more effective futures market. To improve the efficiency of apple futures market, the 
regulators should consider measures to encourage more commercial traders from different 
regions in China into the futures trading.  
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